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The Business Leadership Trust [(BLT)] is geared towards those in the 
business community who enjoy smaller, more personal events with 
congressional leadership that are conducive to frank participation and 
discussion. The BLT meets quarterly for lunch with congressional 
leadership, are included in the annual NRCC [National Republican 
Congressional Committee] Superbowl event, have VIP Convention Benefits 
at the Republican National Convention of 2000 and are automatically 
enrolled as members in all other NRCC support groups. 
 
Membership  
 
Dues are $100,000 per year.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court treats campaign contributions as protected 
political speech under the First Amendment.2 When business corporations 
rather than individuals make such contributions, should they be treated 
differently under the First Amendment?  
While much of modern American law recognizes distinctions based on 
institutions and other real-world categories,3 First Amendment doctrine has 
 1. National Republican Congressional Committee, NRCC Business Leadership Trust, at 
http://www.nrcc.org/contribute/donor-programs/blt.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2001). The NRCC 
website describes the Business Leadership Trust (BLT) as a “Corporate” program, as distinguished 
from the Committee’s “Individual” programs. See id. 
 The similar “Team 2000” program of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
(DCCC) is “specifically designed to work with the leading Democratic supporters nationwide and 
strategically plan how we, as a party, achieve our goals.” Bob Hohler, Kennedy Compound Doors 
Open to $100,000 Democratic Donors, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 1999, at A3 (quoting brochure co-
signed by Representatives Patrick Kennedy and Richard Gephardt). Team 2000 does not explicitly 
target business corporations, but its membership fee, like the BLT’s, is $100,000. Id. Members are 
invited to a weekend retreat at the Kennedy’s family compound in Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id. 
The Democratic Party has also created a “Platinum Circle” for $500,000 contributors, while the 
Republican National Committee introduced a $250,000 “Republican Regents” group. See John Kruger, 
Mega-Donors Get Mega-Perks in Funding War, THE HILL, May 10, 2000, at 10. 
 2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976). 
 3. Frederick Schauer cites, for example, the fracturing of monolithic “contract law” into 
specialized bodies of doctrine for contracts involving insurance, securities, and, it might be added, 
sales and intellectual property. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 199 (1998). Professor Schauer identifies Karl Llewellyn as a 
proponent of this view. See id. (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS (1960); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302-40 
(1985) (explaining Llewellyn’s approach to the Uniform Commercial Code)). 
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stubbornly refused to do so.4 Anglo-American jurisprudence has traditionally 
assumed that judicial decision making should be based on judicial categories 
(that is, legal concepts) rather than prelegal, empirical categories (that is, 
practical, real-world concepts).5 This tendency is especially pronounced in 
First Amendment jurisprudence. As Frederick Schauer has argued, 
“American free speech doctrine has never been comfortable distinguishing 
among institutions. Throughout its history, the doctrine has been persistently 
reluctant to develop its principles in an institution-specific manner, and . . . to 
take account of the cultural, political, and economic differences among the 
differentiated institutions that together comprise a society.”6 
The Supreme Court has displayed this tendency by failing to consider the 
institutional peculiarities of business corporations when applying 
constitutional law to them. The Court has pursued the opposite extremes of 
awarding corporations rights as if they were human beings and insisting that 
the state has power to regulate corporations by fiat. The former approach 
completely ignores the institutional nature of corporations. The latter assigns 
too much importance to the legal category of “corporation” without 
explaining why the legal distinction should make a constitutional difference. 
In pursuing each of these approaches, the Court has relied on outdated, 
metaphysical concepts of the corporation and has failed to consider the ways 
in which corporations actually operate as organizations. Using the example 
of campaign finance jurisprudence, this Article argues that courts applying 
constitutional law to publicly traded business corporations should take into 
account the effects of the corporate governance regime on the corporate 
decision making process.  
Federal law and many state laws regulate corporations’ election-related 
spending more closely than that of individuals.7 Federal law currently 
prohibits business corporations from contributing directly to federal 
candidates.8 The loophole known as “soft money,” however, has enabled 
 4. The most pointed example of this tendency is the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to 
recognize a doctrine of freedom of the press distinct from freedom of speech, despite the existence of 
the First Amendment’s Press Clause. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 84.  
 5. See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 376 (1997); Schauer, supra 
note 3, at 84, 108. But see Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 475 
(1897) (“If a man goes into law it pays to be a master of it, and to be a master of it means to look 
straight through all the dramatic incidents and to discern the true basis for prophecy.”).  
 6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 84. See also Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. 
REV. 735 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence regarding individual speech does not apply to 
the speech of “institutions” that is not attributable to individuals).  
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.1.  
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corporations to evade this restriction.9 As this Article goes to press in April, 
2001, the U.S. Senate has passed a bill that would further affect corporate 
spending in federal elections in two significant ways. Senate Bill 27, 
popularly known as the McCain-Feingold bill, would ban soft money.10 In 
addition, it would prohibit corporations from purchasing certain kinds of 
advertisements immediately before an election.11 If the bill becomes law, it 
will almost certainly be challenged in court on constitutional grounds.12  
This Article argues that the First Amendment analysis of corporate 
campaign finance regulations, such as those in Senate Bill 27, should 
recognize the institutional peculiarities of business corporations. Courts have 
sometimes treated business corporations as if they were identical to 
individuals for constitutional purposes. But political spending by 
corporations should be distinguished from the political spending of 
individuals (and from that by labor unions and nonprofit organizations). 
Despite the tendency to treat corporations like individuals, courts have at 
other times upheld special restrictions on corporations based on the naked 
assertion that states have special power to regulate corporations. The First 
Amendment analysis of corporate campaign finance regulation should be 
firmly grounded on corporate institutional characteristics and avoid the 
tendency toward conclusory reasoning. 
Although the Supreme Court has been suspicious of legal restrictions on 
election-related spending by individuals,13 it has upheld some such 
restrictions on corporations14 and struck down others.15 The Court’s reasons 
for distinguishing corporate expenditures from individual expenditures in the 
latter cases, however, are murky and inconsistent. The Court has failed to 
present a coherent theoretical foundation for the distinction. Given the 
uncertain basis for the distinction, any legislative attempts to restrict 
corporate expenditures or indirect contributions are almost certain to face 
First Amendment challenges. This Article argues that reduced constitutional 
 9. See id. 
 10. S.27, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001). For the vote on the bill, passed April 2, 2001, see U.S. 
Senate, U.S. Senate, at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/vote1071/vote_00064.html (last visited May 
5, 2001). 
 11. S.27 § 203. 
 12. Even before the bill passed the Senate, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), an ardent foe of 
campaign finance restrictions, announced his intent to mount a legal challenge. See Charles Lane, A 
Legal Battle on the Horizon: Court Challenge is Likely if Campaign Bill Becomes Law, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 3, 2001, at A4. 
 13. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1976).  
 14. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667-69 (1990).  
 15. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).  
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protection of election-related spending by publicly traded business 
corporations is both justifiable and desirable. Corporate election-related 
spending is not an exercise of individual expressive rights because business 
corporations have special characteristics that are shaped by the law of 
corporate governance. This legal regime seeks to maximize business 
efficiency by concentrating corporate decision-making authority in 
management. Because corporate election-related spending decisions are not 
made in consultation with a corporation’s shareholders or other constituents, 
such spending does not constitute individual expression. Thus it does not 
deserve the same First Amendment protection enjoyed by individual political 
spending.16 
This Article is composed of eight Parts. Part II describes the extent of 
permissible corporate election-related spending under current campaign 
finance law. Despite a nominal prohibition on corporate spending in 
connection with federal election campaigns, business corporations have 
many legal methods of financial participation in federal, state, and local 
elections. Part III summarizes Supreme Court case law on the 
constitutionality of regulating corporate election-related spending under the 
First Amendment. The Court has declared that election-related spending by 
individuals is protected under the First Amendment, although some state 
regulation of election-related spending may be justified by the need to 
combat political corruption.17 Part IV argues that the Court has justified both 
its proregulatory and antiregulatory decisions with the unconvincing, 
conclusory logic of various traditional theories of the corporation. Part V 
argues that the Court should abandon these hoary models. Instead, the Court 
should integrate into its First Amendment campaign finance jurisprudence a 
 16. This Article is about the types of spending described in Part II, particularly contributions to 
federal candidates and to national political parties, as well as independent expenditures (such as issue 
ads) designed to influence voting in elections. Some might argue that allowing regulation of corporate 
election-related spending may lead down the slippery slope to state censorship of editorializing by 
media enterprises that do business in the corporate form. However, such corporations can be 
distinguished because their shareholders, compared to those of most other corporations, can be more 
accurately described as having authorized the use of corporate resources for political speech. 
Editorializing is the very business of the media. Shareholders in media corporations are aware of this 
fact. Detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the current Article, but other 
commentators have explored it. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ 
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 290-92 (1981); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1057-64 (1998). But see 
Schauer, supra note 3, at 84 (noting the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to distinguish “freedom of the 
press” from “freedom of speech”). 
 17. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60. As noted in Part I, the Court has sometimes suggested that 
corporate election-related spending is entitled to the same First Amendment protection as individual 
spending, and has sometimes held that it is not.  
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modern view of publicly traded business corporations as complex institutions 
made up of rival constituents and shaped by legal and economic forces. Part 
VI explains the complex realities of corporate governance and how these 
realities affect corporate decision making about election-related spending. 
Under the existing corporate governance regime, large business corporations 
are not—nor are they intended to be—instruments of individual expression. 
Part VII suggests ways in which the Court should integrate insights about 
corporate governance into its First Amendment campaign finance 
jurisprudence.  
II. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF CORPORATIONS’ ELECTION-
RELATED SPENDING 
As a preliminary matter, it will be helpful to introduce two terms of 
campaign finance jargon, “contributions” and “expenditures”. The Supreme 
Court’s election law jurisprudence defines them as mutually exclusive 
categories. In the Court’s typology, a source of money makes a 
“contribution” to a candidate’s campaign when it gives money or some other 
thing of value over to the control of the candidate, who decides how it is 
spent or used.18 In contrast, a source makes an “expenditure” when the 
source itself determines and controls how the money is spent.19  
 18. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“[T]he transformation of contributions into 
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”). The Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) uses the terms “contributions” and “expenditures” differently, though the 
precise difference between judicial and legislative definitions is not entirely clear because the 
definitions overlap considerably. Except where otherwise indicated, this Article will follow the Court’s 
definitions of these terms. To refer collectively to expenditures and contributions, this Article will, for 
want of a more elegant phrase, use the term “election-related spending.” In FECA, both categories 
include any “loan”, “advance”, “deposit”, or “gift”. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i) (2000). 
“Expenditure” further includes any “purchase,” “payment,” or “distribution,” as well as a written 
agreement to make an expenditure. Id. § 431(9)(A)(ii). The definition of “contribution” also includes 
“subscriptions”, which are not mentioned in the definition of “expenditures”, though this is not a 
significant difference. Id. § 431(8)(A)(I) (defining the term “contribution”). Thus “contribution” seems 
to refer to money given to a campaign, while “expenditure” appears to include any use of money to 
influence an election, including but not limited to “contributions”. 
 FECA originally placed limits on all election-related expenditures from all sources. See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 608(C) (1976), reprinted in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 190-93 (appendix). In Buckley, however, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Act’s limits on expenditures (in the narrow sense) as applied to 
individuals and political committees. 424 U.S. at 45. The Court held that such entities have the right to 
make expenditures in unlimited amounts as long as those expenditures are “independent” of the 
candidate’s campaign. Id. at 45-48. Buckley did not involve spending by business corporations. 
 19. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20. Expenditures so defined are dominated by political action 
committees (PACs), described infra at Part II.B.2. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires 
reporting of expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 431. PACs are responsible for over ninety-five percent of 
reported expenditures. See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees: Introduction, in CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 123, 126 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). 
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Federal law has prohibited corporate contributions to federal election 
campaigns since 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman Act20 in response 
to the controversy generated by corporate contributions to Theodore 
Roosevelt’s 1904 presidential election campaign.21 Currently, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibits contributions as well as 
expenditures “in connection with” any election for federal office from 
national banks, state or federally chartered corporations, or labor 
organizations.22 At first glance, FECA may seem to shut corporations out of 
campaign finance entirely. However, corporations have many legal methods 
of indirect financial participation in federal elections. Moreover, FECA 
places no restrictions on corporations’ participation in state elections. 
A. State Elections 
FECA prohibits corporate contributions and expenditures in connection 
with federal elections only. A slight majority of states, however, permit 
election-related spending by corporations.23 Some of these states impose no 
 20. Act of January 26, 1907, Pub. L. No. 36, 34 Stat. 864, 864-65, which stated:  
That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any 
laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political 
office. It shall also be unlawful for any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in 
connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a 
Representative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature of a United 
States Senator.  
Id. 
 21. See Adam Winkler, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study: The Corporation in Election 
Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1999). 
 22. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1997). National banks and federally chartered corporations are further 
prohibited from making contributions or expenditures in connection with any election for political 
office, primary, convention, or caucus. See id. § 441b(a). Other than national banks, business 
corporations are predominantly state-chartered. Federally-chartered corporations are beyond the scope 
of this Article, which will use the term “corporation” to refer to state-chartered corporations. 
 In addition to corporations, national banks, and unions, the Act prohibits contributions and 
expenditures from federal contractors, 2 U.S.C. § 441c (1997), foreign governments, political parties, 
corporations, and individual foreign nationals (other than permanent U.S. residents). Id. § 441e. To 
prevent prohibited sources from making surreptitious contributions through permitted sources, the Act 
further prohibits contributions from any source that are contributed in the name of a person other than 
the actual source. Id. § 441f. 
 The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the corporate prohibition with respect to 
ideologically based nonprofit corporations. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
661-65 (1990) (clarifying limits on the scope of the exception); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 
U.S. 238, 258-64 (1986).  
 23. See EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 2000: A 
SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS WITH QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS, chart 2-A (2000), 
available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/cflaw2000.htm and http://www.fec.gov/pages/cfl00chart2A.htm 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2001). 
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ceilings on such spending.24 In addition to candidate elections, many states 
hold elections on policy issues. For example, twenty-four states and the 
District of Columbia use the initiative process, in which votes are cast on 
voter-proposed legislation.25 These states permit corporations to make 
expenditures related to initiative campaigns.26 Thus, corporate contributions 
and expenditures are potentially very important in these states.  
State corporations codes do not specifically restrict corporate election-
related spending. Delaware law, for example, empowers corporations to 
“make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or 
educational purposes,”27 which may be interpreted to permit political 
spending. The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) includes identical 
language in section 3.02(13).28 MBCA section 3.02(15) further empowers 
corporations “to make payments or donations, or do any other act, not 
inconsistent with law, that furthers the business and affairs of the 
corporation.”29 The Official Comment to MBCA section 3.02(15) states: 
“This clause, which is in addition to and independent of the power to make 
charitable and similar donations under section 3.02(13), permits contributions 
for purposes that may not be charitable, such as for political purposes or to 
influence elections.”30  
 24. See id. As of December 31, 1999, Illinois, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia had 
no ceilings on corporate election-related spending. See id. Utah restricted only contributions by 
insurance corporations. See id. Until recently, California allowed unlimited corporate contributions 
except in rare “special elections” held to fill offices vacated between regular elections. In November, 
2000, California voters approved Proposition 34, which imposed ceilings on contributions to candidate 
elections by all “persons”, including corporations. Under Proposition 34, contributions to candidates 
for the legislature are capped at $3,000, while contributions to candidates for governor are capped at a 
generous $20,000. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 85301 (West 2000); see also California Fair Political 
Practices Commission (FPPC), Proposition 34: Changes to California Campaign Finance Law, 
available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/News/prop34chart.htm (Nov. 2000). 
 25. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE 27-28 (2000). In some 
cases, voters may also vote on other kinds of policy questions, such as the approval of legislation 
passed by the legislature, or on state constitutional amendments. See id. at 7. The term “referendum” is 
sometimes used to refer generically to all types of public votes on policy issues. See id. 
 26. See id. at 191. 
 27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1999). 
 28. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (rev. ed. 1999). 
 29. Id. § 3.02(15) (1999). More than 20 states have enacted MBCA sections 3.02(13) and (15) or 
similar provisions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-302 (West 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7-103-102 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0302 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-302 
(2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2 (West 2000). This broad grant of power may be narrowed by the 
state’s campaign finance laws. See FEIGENBAUM & PALMER, supra note 23 (summarizing state laws). 
 30. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(15) off. cmt. (emphasis added). Of the states that have 
incorporated §§ 3.02(13) and (15) into their corporations codes, Idaho, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina also append to their relevant code sections the quoted language from the Official Comment. 
IDAHO CODE § 30-1-302 (Michie 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3-02 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-3-
102 (Law. Co-op. 1990). The “Code Revision Committee Comment” to the Colorado code includes 
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Some non-MBCA states also have statutory language which, if broadly 
construed, might be interpreted to authorize political contributions or 
expenditures. For example, California, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New York, and North Dakota authorize corporate donations for 
“civic purposes.”31 Several states specifically authorize donations that do not 
benefit the corporation.32 In addition, the Massachusetts Corporations Code 
does not, by itself, give corporations the power to make political 
contributions. Instead, it allows a corporation to authorize directors or 
officers to do so by articles, by-laws, or by a vote of stockholders.33 
B. Federal Elections 
Corporate funding plays an important role in federal elections as well as 
state elections, FECA notwithstanding. The primary mechanisms for 
corporate involvement in federal elections are “soft money” and political 
action committees (PACs). 
1. Soft Money 
The Federal Election Commission (FEC), which administers FECA, has 
taken a permissive stance toward the role of so-called “soft money” in federal 
elections. “Soft money” refers to political party funds made up of 
contributions that do not conform to the “hard” rules of FECA, including 
contributions from corporations.34 The regulation of soft money is the 
centerpiece of the current campaign finance reform movement.35 In 1999-
2000, the two major political parties raised nearly $500 million in soft 
the quoted language but omits the italicized clause. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-103-102 (West 2000). 
 31. CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:41 (West 1969): 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN’S § 2-103(13)(ii) (1985); MINN. STAT. § 302A.161(11) (West 
1985); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.385(15) (West 1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(12) (McKinney 
1986): N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1985).  
 32. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.161 (West 
2000); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202 (McKinney 2000). 
 33. MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 155, § 12C (West 2000). 
 34. “Soft money” also includes union contributions and individual contributions in excess of 
FECA limits. Using FEC data, the Center for Responsive Politics identified 1,008 organizations that 
made soft money contributions of $100,000 or more in 1999-2000. This includes contributions by 
individuals affiliated with the organizations, but the website also breaks down “organization” totals 
into organization and individual contributions. See Center for Responsive Politics Website, List of Top 
Soft Money Donors, available at http://www.opensecrets.org/parties (last visited Apr. 30, 2001). 
Although unions are prominent among the largest contributors, businesses, many if not most of which 
appear to be corporations, dominate the list. See id. 
 35. See S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). 
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money.36 The Republican Party raised 74% more than in the previous 
presidential election cycle, and the Democrats raised 85% more.37 FECA 
regulations require political parties to maintain separate “federal” accounts 
that may not contain soft money.38 Soft money is thus sometimes referred to 
as “nonfederal” money.39 In theory, political parties may use only federal 
money in connection with federal elections. In reality, however, soft money 
plays an important role in federal elections.  
Despite FECA’s nominal ban on corporate contributions in connection 
with federal elections, FECA regulations allow parties to use soft money to 
pay part of the costs of activities characterized as benefiting both federal and 
nonfederal candidates.40 As a result, even party committees clearly intended 
for the benefit of federal candidates, such as the Democratic Congressional 
Campaign Committee and the National Republican Congressional 
Committee, openly solicit corporate soft money contributions.41  
Soft money originated as an exception that has grown to swallow much of 
the rule against corporate contributions to federal campaigns. Following the 
1976 presidential election, leaders of both parties complained that FECA 
restrictions had curtailed “party-building” activities and had thus reduced the 
role of party organizations in the election.42 In response, Congress amended 
FECA in 1979 to allow political parties to expend unlimited amounts for 
such party-building activities as voter identification and registration, voter 
turnout, and certain campaign materials, as long as the money was raised in 
accordance with FECA guidelines.43  
As Congress lifted restrictions on party spending, the FEC carved out 
exceptions to FECA that allowed the parties to use nonfederal funds for an 
increased range of activities. In 1976, the FEC stated that parties may use 
nonfederal funds to finance a portion of their administrative and overhead 
 36. See News Release, Federal Election Commission, Party Fundraising Escalates, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/press/pty00text.htm (Nov. 3, 2000). 
 37. Id.  
 38. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.5 (2000). 
 39. See, e.g., Mitch McConnell, In Defense of Soft Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, § 4, at 17. 
 40. See Note, Soft Money; The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 
1326-27 (1998) (citing 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(1) (1999)). National party committees must pay for sixty-
five percent of such costs with hard money in presidential election years, and sixty percent in 
nonpresidential election years. 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2) (1999). The parties can meet the remaining 
thirty-five or forty percent of the costs with soft money.  
 41. See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser, Democrats’ Fast Track is ‘Soft Money’, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 
1999, at A1. 
 42. See Anthony Corrado, Party Soft Money: Introduction, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 19, at 167, 170.  
 43. Id. at 170-71. 
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costs.44 Because such spending benefited both federal and nonfederal 
candidates, the FEC allowed parties to allocate the costs between federal and 
nonfederal funds according to the number of state and federal candidates in 
that year’s elections.45  
In the same opinion, the Commission prohibited the use of nonfederal 
funds to pay for a portion of voter registration drives and other election-
related activities that would benefit both federal and nonfederal candidates.46 
Just two years later, however, the FEC reversed itself and extended the 
allocation logic to a state party’s voter drive.47 Although this 1978 opinion 
referred to a state party’s use of nonfederal funds, the allocation rule applied 
to national parties as well. Thus, national party organizations were soon 
raising large amounts of nonfederal funds.48 The FEC’s approval of the use 
of nonfederal funds, combined with Congress’s removal of restrictions on 
party-building expenditures, restored political clout to corporations, unions, 
and other funding sources prohibited from making direct contributions or 
expenditures. 
FECA did not clarify the boundaries of soft money’s permissible uses 
until new regulations took effect in 1991.49 Although these regulations 
imposed some restrictions, they placed no ceilings on the raising or spending 
of soft money. In addition, they codified the FECA advisory opinions 
permitting the use of nonfederal funds to pay for a portion of expenses that 
benefit federal candidates.50 Thus the new rules, which gave the parties “a 
 44. FEC Advisory Op. 1976-72, reprinted in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM, supra note 19, at 
187.   
 45. Id. The FEC gave greater weight to federal candidates; thus, although only fifteen percent 
were federal candidates, the FEC required the party to allocate one-third of its administrative expenses 
to federal funds. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Allocation of Costs for Voter Registration, FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10, [1976-1990 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 5340 (Aug. 29, 1978). The Commission 
rejected a dissenting commissioner’s argument that the use of nonfederal funds, which may include 
corporate and union contributions, violates the Act’s ban on the use of corporate and union funds “in 
connection with” a federal election. See id. (Comm’r Thomas E. Harris, dissenting) Commissioner 
Harris pointed out acidly that one of the commissioners voting in favor of Advisory Opinion 1978-10 
was the author of the contrary 1976 opinion. See id. 
 As a general matter, the impact of FEC advisory opinions in the absence of judicial or legislative 
pronouncements raises some thorny questions about administrative competency. Cf. Donna M. Nagy, 
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a 
Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998) (raising similar questions about the influence 
of SEC no-action letters). 
 48. See Corrado, supra note 42, at 172-73. 
 49. A federal court ordered the FEC to promulgate these regulations in response to a lawsuit by 
Common Cause, a group which advocates for campaign finance reform. See Common Cause v. FEC, 
692 F. Supp. 1391, 1396 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 50.  See id.  
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clearer sense of how to spend soft money legally,” appear to have contributed 
to significant increases in the use of soft money.51  
The role of corporate money in federal elections grew even larger when 
the parties began to make extensive use of soft money to finance 
advertisements in support of their candidates. The Supreme Court has held 
that Congress may regulate political expenditures on advertising only if they 
“in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate.”52 Courts have tended to define this concept of “express 
advocacy” very narrowly.53 Thus the question arose whether FECA 
prohibited the use of soft money on advertisements designed to support or 
attack candidates by focusing on issues without “expressly advocating” a 
candidate’s election or defeat. In 1995, the FEC permitted the Republican 
National Committee to use soft money to pay for portions of the cost of issue 
ads.54 These advertisements urged support for GOP positions on federal 
legislative issues and criticized President Clinton but did not “expressly 
advocate” the election or defeat of any particular federal candidate. The issue 
ad concept was stretched to (and indeed beyond) its logical limit during the 
1996 and 2000 elections. Both parties used soft money to pay a portion55 of 
the costs of ads that included the names, faces, and even biographies of the 
presidential candidates but that were carefully crafted to narrowly avoid 
“expressly advocating” the election or defeat of a particular candidate.56  
2. Corporate PACs 
In addition to contributing to parties, a corporation may establish a 
“separate segregated fund” out of which it can make its own direct 
 51. Corrado, supra note 42, at 175.  
 52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976). 
 53. The Buckley Court stated that “express words of advocacy” include “vote for,” “elect”, 
“support”, “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat”, and “reject”. Id. at 44 
n.52. Most lower courts have held that election-related advocacy may be regulated only if it includes 
the “magic words” listed in Buckley. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the 
Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1754-59 (1999) (citing cases). 
 54. The FEC stated that such ads qualified as either “administrative expenses” or “costs of 
generic voter drives,” of which forty percent can be paid for with nonfederal money in a 
nonpresidential election year under 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2)(ii) (1999). See Costs of Advertising to 
Influence Congressional Legislation Allocated to both Federal and Nonfederal Funds, FEC Advisory 
Op. 1995-25, Fed. Election Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 6,162 (Aug. 24, 1995).  
 55. Assuming the ads were indeed a legal use of soft money, the permissible portion would have 
been thirty-five percent of the total cost. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2)(i) (2000). 
 56. See Corrado, supra note 42, at 175 (regarding ads in the 1996 elections); 147 CONG. REC. 
2705 (2001) (regarding ads in the 2000 election). Following the 1996 election, both campaigns, and 
even Senator Bob Dole himself, openly admitted the obvious—that the issue ads were intended for 
electioneering purposes. See Note, supra note 40, at 1333-36.  
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contributions to and expenditures on behalf of federal candidates.57 Such a 
fund is commonly known as a corporate political action committee (PAC).58 
A separate segregated fund may contain only voluntary contributions 
specifically intended to support the fund’s political purpose.59 The 
corporation may not contribute to its PAC, nor may the corporation or the 
PAC solicit contributions from the general public.60 The corporation may 
solicit voluntary contributions from the corporation’s stockholders, 
management, and administration, which together are known as the 
corporation’s “restricted class.”61 Twice a year, the corporation may solicit 
contributions from employees outside the restricted class, as well as from 
their families.62  
Although a corporate PAC is funded by voluntary contributions and not 
from corporate assets or revenues, it is not financially independent of the 
corporation. FECA specifically permits corporations to use corporate funds 
outside of the separate segregated fund to establish the PAC, to pay for its 
administration, and to solicit contributions from the restricted class.63 In this 
way, FECA very clearly allows the use of corporate property to support 
federal election campaigns. Furthermore, PACs use corporate property 
primarily to further the views of managers; PACs solicit contributions 
 57. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1997). 
 58. “PAC” is not a technical term and appears nowhere in FECA. Corporate PACs disbursed a 
total of $106,221,041 in 1999-2000, of which $60,871,011 were contributions to candidates. See 
Federal Election Committee, Summary of PAC Activity, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/press/pachist1800.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2001). This Article discusses only 
corporate PACs; some PACs are genuine stand-alone political organizations and not the segregated 
funds of any parent corporation or other organization. 
 Although corporate PACs are permitted to contribute only $5,000 to any one federal candidate, 2 
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 110.2(b) (2000), they can easily evade this limit by means of 
“PAC bundling.” A PAC engages in “bundling” by soliciting from individual members contributions 
made out directly to the candidate, which the PAC then presents to the candidate. Fred Wertheimer & 
Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of our Democracy, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1140-41 (1994). The “bundled” contributions are technically made by the 
individual contributor and not by the PAC itself; thus, the aggregate amount of bundled contributions 
is not restricted by the $5,000 limit. “The PAC, however, gets the credit—and the influence that flows 
from it—for giving the total amount of bundled contributions to the candidate.” Id. at 1141.  
 59. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a). The Supreme Court refers to corporate property other than the 
segregated fund as the corporate “treasury” or “general treasury,” terms not used in FECA or in 
corporations law. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990); Mass. 
Citizens for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986). 
 60. 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.5(b),(g)(1). 
 61. 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(j). Ostensibly, voluntary contributions may not always be truly voluntary if 
a corporation’s board solicits contributions from officers or other employees. If employees contribute 
on the tacit understanding that their contributions are a condition of employment, then the corporation 
is, in effect, making contributions to the PAC in the guise of employee compensation. 
 62. 11 C.F.R. § 114.6(a).  
 63. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2000); 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.1(b), 114.5(b).  
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primarily from managers and thus need not represent the views of 
shareholders or lower-level employees.64 PAC administrative costs are by no 
means nominal. Such costs often exceed the amount of the PAC’s actual 
contributions to candidates.65 Furthermore, the corporation’s management 
may control the PAC’s management, appoint its officers, and direct the 
raising and spending of its funds.66 
3. Internal Communications and Issue Advocacy 
In addition to allowing corporate spending for the administration and 
solicitation of PAC funds, FECA permits two types of direct corporate 
spending in connection with federal elections. First, a corporation may use 
general corporate property above and beyond the separate segregated fund to 
pay for any political communications to members of its restricted class, 
including express partisan advocacy.67 Second, as noted above in connection 
with soft money, FECA’s ban on corporate expenditures applies only to 
“express advocacy.” Thus corporations may use general corporate property 
to pay for issue advocacy in connection with an election for federal office as 
long as it does not “expressly advocate” the victory or defeat of a particular 
candidate.68 As discussed above,69 the link between express candidate 
advocacy and issue advocacy is a fine one.  
4. Charitable Contributions and Conduits 
FECA notwithstanding, corporations can indirectly support federal 
campaigns by donating to educational organizations. The corporations codes 
of most states as well as the District of Columbia specifically authorize 
corporations to make donations to charitable and educational organizations.70 
 64. See Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 126-27 
(1992). 
 65. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (1995). 
 66. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d). 
 67. Id. § 114.3(a). See Trevor Potter, Where are We Now? The Current State of Campaign 
Finance Law, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK, supra note 19, at 11. Specifically, a 
corporation may direct such communications to its “restricted class,” defined in the regulations as “its 
stockholders, executive and administrative personnel, and their families, and the executive and 
administrative personnel of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, and departments, and their families.” 
11 C.F.R. § 114.1(j).  
 68. See Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 471-72 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that FECA applies only to 
express candidate advocacy); FEC v. Nat’l Org. of Women, 713 F. Supp. 428, 433-35 (D.D.C. 1989) 
(holding that FEC prohibitions on corporate expenditures apply only to materials that explicitly 
recommend voting for or against a specific candidate).  
 69. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 
 70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2000) (“Every corporation created under this 
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However, groups considered educational for purposes of tax-exempt status 
include many whose primary purpose is to advocate for political issues, such 
as partisan “think tanks.”71 In extreme cases, tax-exempt educational 
organizations may be used as conduits to channel funds from donors to 
political candidates.72 
chapter shall have power to . . . Make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes . . . .”). See also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.010(13) (Michie 1989); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-302(13) (West 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-25-103 (Michie 1987); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 207(e) (West Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-304(13) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 607.0302 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-302(13) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-4(13) 
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-302 (Michie 2000); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-10 (West 2000); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2(13) (West 1989); IOWA CODE § 490.302(13) (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6102(9) (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271.A-020(13) (Banks-Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:41(B)(12) (West 1969); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-103(13) (1985); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 155, § 12C (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 450 § 450.1261(k) (West 1990); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.161(11) (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1-3 (1989); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 351.385(15) (West 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(6) (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:4 
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4(M) (Michie 
1989); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3-02(a)(13) 
(1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(D) (Anderson 
1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(9) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.077(n) (1989); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1502(9) (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4(13) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 33-3-102(13) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-2- 58(13) (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-13-102(13) (1988); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02A(14) (Vernon 1990); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 16-10-4(m) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1852(13) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
627(12) (Michie 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.03.020(o) (West 1990); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-
8(m) (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0302 (West 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-302(a)(xiii) 
(Michie 1990). The source of this list is E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and 
the Great Corporate Giveaway, 22 PAC. L. J. 221, 222 n.2 (1991). 
 71. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Silence and Power in Corporate and Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1140 & n.126 (1997). 
 72. See generally Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt 
Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881 (1997). 
 According to Frances Hill, such conduits may have tax-exempt status as “social welfare 
organizations” under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (this includes politically active groups like the Sierra Club and 
National Rifle Association) or as “trade associations” under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (such as the Chamber 
of Commerce in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). Id. at 924-25. 
Even I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charitable or educational organizations may indirectly channel funds to 
candidates, although they are prohibited from supporting or opposing candidates for office. Id. at 927. 
Professor Hill cites the famous example of the Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Fund, through which 
funds solicited by GOPAC and employees of Representative Newt Gingrich were channeled to support 
and disseminate a series of college lectures Representative Gingrich taught. Id. at 929-30. 
 The Christian Coalition enjoyed tax exempt status for many years while actively supporting 
Republican political candidates. See Sam Fulwood, III, Christian Coalition Denied Tax-Exempt Status 
by IRS Agency, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1999, at A14. This activity ultimately led the IRS to revoke the 
Coalition’s tax exempt status. See id. 
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON THE REGULATION OF ELECTION-
RELATED SPENDING 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court first analyzed campaign spending 
under the First Amendment based on an individual spending paradigm.73 
Corporations subsequently relied on Buckley to bring First Amendment 
challenges to laws regulating corporate election-related spending.74 The 
Court first suggested that corporations should be treated no differently from 
individuals75 but retreated considerably from that position in later cases.76 As 
this Part will show, the Court has not given clear or consistent justifications 
for these decisions regarding corporate election-related spending. 
A. Buckley v. Valeo 
As enacted, FECA set maximum limits on all contributions and 
expenditures in connection with federal elections. Buckley struck down 
FECA’s limits on independent expenditures but upheld its ceilings on 
contributions.77 According to the Court, any limits on individuals’ election-
related spending place burdens on constitutionally protected speech.78 The 
Court found, however, that limits on contributions raise less serious First 
Amendment concerns than limits on expenditures.79 A campaign contribution 
has limited expressive content because it does not reveal the contributor’s 
reasons for supporting the candidate.80 It merely symbolically expresses the 
fact that the contributor supports the candidate.81 As long as an individual is 
allowed to make a contribution, this merely symbolic expressive purpose is 
achieved, regardless of the amount of money contributed. Thus, a limitation 
on individual contribution amounts imposes “only a marginal restriction” on 
political expression.82 Moreover, a “sufficiently important” government 
interest—the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption that 
may undermine the integrity of and the public’s faith in the political 
 73. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 74. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); First Nat’l 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 769 (1978). 
 75. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85, 791. 
 76. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60; FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 
(1982). 
 77. Buckley, 425 U.S. at 58. 
 78. Id. at 19-22. 
 79. See id. at 20. 
 80. Id. at 20-21. 
 81. Id. at 21. 
 82. Id. at 20. 
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system—justifies this limited burden on speech.83 Major contributors may 
command or be perceived as commanding political favors from elected 
officials as a quid pro quo for their financial support.84  
In contrast, “because virtually every means of communicating ideas in 
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money,” a limit on the 
amount of money an individual may independently spend to support a 
candidate constitutes a restriction on the amount of political expression.85 
Therefore, restrictions on expenditures constitute a heavier burden on 
political speech than restrictions on contributions.86 Furthermore, because the 
spender, not the candidate, controls the content of an independently funded 
message, an expenditure is less valuable to a candidate than a contribution 
and may even harm the candidate’s campaign.87 As a result, the Court held, 
an expenditure poses less danger of corruption than a contribution does.88 
Thus the state interest in combating corruption does not justify limits on 
individuals’ expenditures.89 
While recognizing the corruption rationale as a ground for regulation, the 
Buckley Court vociferously rejected another proffered rationale. The Court 
insisted that the government has no compelling interest in “equalizing the 
 83. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.  
 84. See id. at 26-27. The Court, like the entire nation, was concerned about corruption and the 
public’s loss of faith in government following the Watergate scandal and the election law abuses 
uncovered in its aftermath. See id. at 27 & n.28 (citing 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Thus, 
the Buckley Court presumed that political contributions can cause corruption or a public perception of 
corruption, even though no evidence to that effect had been adduced. The amount and kind of evidence 
required to support an allegation of corruption or the appearance of corruption remains unclear. See 
David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain 
Campaign Finance Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85 (1999) (describing lower courts’ struggle over the lack of 
an evidentiary standard). In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), the 
Court declined to clarify the evidentiary standard. Acknowledging that Buckley lacked “precision”, id. 
at 386, the Court nonetheless found that Nixon “does not present a close call requiring further 
definition.” Id. at 393. 
 85. 424 U.S. at 19. The idea that election-related spending is a form of political speech is 
fundamental to the Court’s jurisprudence, a position that will be accepted for the purposes of this 
Article. There is, however, a vigorous debate with respect to this issue. Most famously, Judge J. Skelly 
Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has argued that political money is 
“speech-related conduct” distinguishable from political expression, which constitutes the “pure 
speech” at the core of the First Amendment. J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money 
Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1007-08 (1976). Judge Wright sat on the en banc panel whose per curiam 
opinion upholding FECA’s restrictions was reversed in part by Buckley. See also Spencer A. Overton, 
Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235 
(2000) (arguing that, for constitutional purposes, limitations on election-related spending are more 
analogous to restrictions on the use of property than to restrictions on speech). 
 86. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48. 
 87. Id. at 47. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 47-48. 
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relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of 
elections.”90 Rather, the First Amendment was intended to foster the broad 
dissemination of diverse ideas, and “the concept that government may restrict 
the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”91  
B. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of 
FECA’s disparate treatment of business corporations and individuals. It has, 
however, addressed FECA’s treatment of nonprofit corporations in 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life v. FEC92 and addressed state law treatment of 
business corporations’ election-related spending in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti93 and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.94 
 90. Id. at 48.  
 91. Id. This antiequalization concept long predates Buckley. Its focus on the value of ideas rather 
than of individuals is reminiscent of Justice Holmes’s famous argument for “free trade in ideas” on the 
ground that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The 
antiequalization argument has appeared more recently in Charles Fried, The New First Amendment 
Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE MODERN STATE 225, 226-27 
(Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992); Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious 
Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (1994); and Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 678-81 (1997) [hereinafter, 
Sullivan, Political Money].  
 On the other hand, many other commentators argue that the First Amendment allows or even 
requires the state to ensure equal participation in political debate. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN 
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 22-26 (1989) (arguing that the proper unit of analysis for freedom 
of speech purposes is not the idea but the individual); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 
75 (1948) (arguing that the purpose of the First Amendment “is to give to every voting member of the 
body politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the 
citizens of a self-governing society must deal”); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional 
Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160 
(1994) (arguing for an equalization rule in campaign finance jurisprudence); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994) (same).  
 Margaret Jane Radin and Kathleen M. Sullivan provide a good overview of this debate. Compare 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 164-83 (1996) (in favor of equalization), with 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 959-60 (1995) 
(against equalization). Both scholars reject the “marketplace” metaphor but arrive at very different 
conclusions about the antiequalization rule. See RADIN, supra, at 164-83; Sullivan, supra, at 949, 959-
60. 
 Debating the merits of the antiequalization principle is beyond the scope of this Article and 
beyond the expertise of its author. Rather, this Article simply accepts Buckley’s antiequalization rule 
as a central, controlling principle of campaign finance jurisprudence and argues that the Court has 
incorrectly applied this principle in the corporate context. 
 92. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 93. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 94. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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Bellotti and Austin take very different approaches to the First Amendment 
analysis of corporate election-related spending. In Bellotti, the first major 
case addressing the issue, the Court suggested that no reason exists to treat 
corporate and individual spending differently under the First Amendment.95 
Later, however, in Austin and other cases, the Court contradicted this 
suggestion and stated that spending by business corporations should be 
regulated more closely than that of individuals.96 Bellotti failed to 
satisfactorily explain why corporate and individual spending are equivalent 
under the First Amendment; unfortunately, Austin failed to explain why they 
are not. 
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether Buckley’s 
prohibition on the restriction of expenditures applied to corporations. A 
Massachusetts state statute prohibited business corporations, banks, and 
certain other corporations from making contributions or expenditures for the 
purpose of influencing “any question submitted to the voters,” except with 
respect to questions “materially affecting the property, business or assets of 
the corporation.”97 The legislature had submitted for voter approval a state 
constitutional amendment that would permit the legislature to enact a 
graduated personal income tax.98 A group of corporations planning to make 
expenditures in opposition to the amendment brought suit to prevent 
enforcement of the statute.99 
The Bellotti Court struck down the statute on the ground that the public 
interest in hearing debate on governmental affairs justified protecting the 
spending from regulation under the First Amendment.100 The Court asserted 
that the First Amendment covers both the individual self-expression of 
speakers and the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
 95. Bellotti, 494 U.S. at 657. The Bellotti Court refused to address corporate First Amendment 
rights as a distinct issue, even though the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (MSJC) had 
predicated its decision below on the ground that corporations do not enjoy the same First Amendment 
rights as individuals. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 
1977). The MSJC held that the First Amendment protects a corporation’s speech concerning a general 
political issue only when that issue “materially affects [the] corporation’s business, property or assets.” 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 771 (quoting First National, 359 N.E.2d at 1270).  
 96. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990); Mass. 
Citizens for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197, 207 (1982). 
 97. 435 U.S. at 768 n.2 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)). 
 98. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 769. 
 99. Id. at 769. As the Court observed, the statute was “linked to the legislature’s repeated 
submissions to the voters” of the amendment that would authorize the graduated tax, which had 
appeared on the ballot and had been defeated three times prior to the election at issue in the case. Id. at 
769 n.3. Indeed, the version of the statute at issue specified that questions involving personal income 
tax did not “materially affect” business corporations. Id. 
 100. Id. at 776.  
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informing the public.”101 Because the constitutional protection derived from 
the public interest in hearing the speech, the Court stated that it was 
unnecessary to address whether corporations, as speakers, have the same 
First Amendment rights as individuals.102 In other words, the rights of 
speakers and the interests of listeners are two distinct First Amendment 
concerns. The latter is sufficient to justify the protection of speech even when 
individual expressive rights are not at issue.103 
Nonetheless, the Court also strongly suggested that corporations have the 
same constitutional right as individuals to participate in public discourse. For 
example, the Court stated that the government may not “dictat[e] the subjects 
about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public 
issue.”104 Furthermore, the Court cited the Buckley principle that the state 
may not “restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others.”105 The individual is the paradigmatic 
“element of society” with a right to participate in political discourse; this 
passage suggests that corporations are equivalent elements of society. 
In defense of the statute, the State argued that despite the potential value 
of the speech, the statute served the State’s countervailing compelling interest 
in protecting shareholders.106 The State contended that the statute protected 
 101. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. at 777 n.12 (“The individual’s interest in self-expression is a concern of the First 
Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed [political] discussion, although the two 
often converge.”); cf. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive 
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 731 (1998) (“An intended and justifying 
consequence of rights is that through protecting the interests of specific plaintiffs, rights also realize 
the interests of others, including the construction of a political culture with a specific kind of 
character.”). 
 The informational value of spending is sometimes characterized as an individual “right” to hear 
political messages. Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, refers to speech as implicating speakers’ “active” 
speech rights and listeners’ “passive” speech rights. Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: 
A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. 
REV. 1229 (1991). While it may ultimately be grounded in the idea of a categorical right to informed 
self-government, courts correctly treat the idea of listeners’ rights more as a social welfare concern 
rather than as a personal right to be asserted by individuals. Courts have not recognized any plaintiff 
with standing to assert this “right” in litigation, and it is difficult to imagine how they could. Cf. Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (finding plaintiffs have no standing to bring an 
action “claiming only harm to [their] and every other citizen’s interest in proper application of the 
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [plaintiffs] than it 
does the public at large”). 
 104. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85 (citing Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). The 
Court further argued that allowing the state to limit business corporations’ speech to issues of business 
concerns would inevitably lead to limits on the permissible topics of speech for “‘religious, charitable, 
or civic’ corporations.” Id. at 785. 
 105. Id. at 791.  
 106. See id. at 787. Justice White pursued this argument in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 812. 
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shareholders by “preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of 
views with which some shareholders may disagree.”107 The Court identified 
the protection of shareholders as both a legitimate state interest and one 
traditionally within the province of state law.108 The Court assumed, without 
deciding, that this interest may be sufficiently compelling to justify burdens 
on speech.109 The Court found, however, that corporate election-related 
spending did not implicate that interest because shareholders themselves 
control corporate spending “through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.”110  
C. Massachusetts Citizens for Life v. FEC 
Despite Bellotti’s rhetoric about the constitutionally protected nature of 
election-related spending regardless of the corporate identity of the spender, 
subsequent Supreme Court cases have indicated that it is permissible to place 
greater restrictions on business corporations than on individuals. In FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL),111 the Court struck down FECA’s 
limitations on corporate expenditures as applied to Massachusetts Citizens 
for Life (MCFL), a “nonprofit, nonstock corporation” formed under 
Massachusetts law specifically to promote the antiabortion cause.112 The 
Court found that MCFL had “features more akin to voluntary political 
associations than business firms.”113 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, however, the Court upheld a state’s identical limitations on 
corporate expenditures as applied to a nonprofit corporation. The Court 
found that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce represented the interests of 
business corporations and itself resembled a for-profit business 
corporation.114  
The MCFL opinion included extensive dicta about the “corrosive 
influence” of corporate wealth on electoral politics.115 The Court made clear 
that it perceived this as a threat posed only by business corporations, rather 
 107. Id. at 792-93.  
 108. Id. at 792 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82-84 (1975)).  
 109. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
 110. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794. Thus, the Court found the statute overinclusive in that it would 
prohibit spending authorized by shareholders, even if authorized “unanimously”. Id. at 794-95. The 
Court further found the statute underinclusive because it prohibited corporate expenditures only in 
connection with voter referenda and not with respect to other politically or ideologically related 
spending. Id. at 793. 
 111. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 112. See id. at 241-42.  
 113. Id. at 263.  
 114. Austin, 494 U.S. at 669. 
 
 115. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257. 
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than by incorporated organizations per se.116 The Court’s definition of 
“corrosive influence” however, diverged significantly from the “corruption” 
identified as a compelling state interest in Buckley and Bellotti.117 The Court 
explained that “[d]irect corporate spending on political activity raises the 
prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to 
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”118 The advantage is 
supposedly unfair because the size of a business corporation’s treasury is not 
a measure of popular support for the corporation’s political positions but, 
rather, the result of “economically motivated decisions of investors and 
customers.”119 Without citing to precedent, the MCFL Court called this 
“threat to the political marketplace” a justification for unique limits on 
corporate election-related spending.120 MCFL contradicts Buckley’s “anti-
equalization” principle by suggesting that it is unfair for wealthy corporations 
to spend large amounts of money unless their political positions have popular 
support.121 The MCFL Court gave a passing nod to the antiequalization 
rule,122 but did not address the contradiction. 
Having described the dangers of election-related spending by business 
corporations, the Court found that corporations like MCFL had “features 
more akin to voluntary political associations than business firms, and 
therefore should not have to bear burdens on independent spending solely 
because of their incorporated status.”123 The Court specified three features of 
MCFL “essential” to its holding.  
First, [MCFL] was formed for the express purpose of promoting 
political ideas, and [it] cannot engage in business activities . . . . This 
ensures that political resources reflect political support. Second, 
[MCFL] has no shareholders or other persons affiliated [who would] 
have a claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons 
connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive 
for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity. 
Third, MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a labor 
union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such entities. 
 116. See id. at 257-58 (describing the specific dangers posed by business corporations). 
 117. The Court did not cite either Buckley or Bellotti in defining “corrosive influence.” See id. at 
257. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 258. 
 120. Id.  
 121. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257 (“Political free trade does not necessarily require 
that all who participate in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.”). 
 123. Id. at 263. 
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This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type 
of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace.124 
D. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce  
Ironically, although MCFL’s nonbusiness nature was “essential” to the 
First Amendment protection of its election-related spending, the Court 
explicitly left open the question of whether FECA’s ban on corporate 
expenditures is constitutional as applied to business corporations.125 The 
issue of corporate expenditures in candidate elections surfaced again in 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce.126 The Austin Court relied 
on an expanded version of MCFL’s dicta regarding the “unfair” and 
“corrosive” role of business corporations to uphold state-law restrictions on 
corporate expenditures.127 The Michigan State Chamber of Commerce was a 
nonprofit corporation funded through the annual dues of its members, three 
quarters of which were business corporations.128 The Michigan Campaign 
Finance Act allowed corporations to engage in election-related spending only 
from a separate segregated fund.129 This rule was patterned after § 441b of 
FECA.130 The Chamber planned to defy the rule and make an independent 
political expenditure from its general funds by purchasing a newspaper 
advertisement supporting a candidate for state office.131 It sued for injunctive 
relief against the enforcement of the statute.132 
The Austin Court acknowledged Bellotti’s holding that corporate 
spending implicates First Amendment interests.133 The Court also conceded 
that, according to Buckley, independent expenditures create less risk of quid 
pro quo corruption than do contributions.134 According to the Court, 
however, the Michigan statute targeted a “different type of corruption”: the 
“corrosive” effect on electoral politics caused by the wealth of business 
 
 
 124. Id. at 264. 
 125. Id. at 263. 
 126. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 127. Id. at 660. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 654-55.  
 130. Id. at 655 n.1. See also 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000). 
 131. Austin, 494 U.S. at 656. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 652. Although the Bellotti Court specifically refused to address whether corporations 
have First Amendment rights, Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776, the Austin Court abandoned Bellotti’s 
“listeners’ interests” theory of First Amendment protection. Instead, it stated that the statute “burdens 
the Chamber’s exercise of expression.” Austin, 494 U.S. at 658. Cf. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 
252 (referring to “MCFL’s First Amendment rights”). 
 
 134. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. 
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corporations.135 According to the Court, two related aspects of corporate 
wealth conspire to create a risk of “unfair advantage” resulting in the 
“corrosion” of politics.136 First, the Court repeated the contention from 
MCFL that corporate wealth is not a measure of “popular support” for the 
corporation’s political positions but rather, only a measure of “economically 
motivated decisions of investors and customers.”137 The Court emphasized, 
however, that disproportionate economic power alone does not justify 
regulation.138 Rather, the unfairness stems from a second factor: “State law 
grants corporations special advantages” facilitating their accumulation of 
wealth.139 Such advantages include “limited liability, perpetual life, and 
favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”140  
The Court found that although the Chamber was a nonprofit organization, 
it resembled a business corporation closely enough to be treated as one for 
First Amendment purposes.141 The Chamber could not satisfy the three 
elements that the Court had labeled “essential” to distinguishing MCFL from 
business corporations in MCFL.142 First, MCFL was founded solely for a 
specific political purpose.143 By contrast, the Chamber pursued, in addition to 
political activities, many purposes that the Court described as “not inherently 
political,” including business-related education and group insurance.144 
Second, MCFL’s members were not shareholders or persons with a similar 
economic disincentive to dissociate from the organization if they disagreed 
with its policies.145 Although it had no shareholders, the Chamber offered 
significant material benefits to its members that would create a similar 
disincentive.146 Finally, business corporations neither established nor funded 
MCFL, while three-quarters of the Chamber’s members, whose donations 
supported the Chamber, were business corporations.147 According to the 
Court, the Chamber could thus serve as a device for business corporations to 
circumvent existing restrictions on corporate election-related spending.148 
Austin upheld a restriction on independent expenditures by corporations, 
 135. Id. at 660.  
 136. Id. 
 137. 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 258).  
 138. Id. at 660. 
 139. Id. at 658. 
 140. Id. at 658-59. 
 141. Id. at 661-62. 
 142. Id. at 662 (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263). 
 143. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264. 
 144. Austin, 494 U.S. at 662. 
 145. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264. 
 146. Austin, 494 U.S. at 663. 
 147. Id. at 664. 
 
 148. Id.  
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despite the fact that Bellotti suggested that corporate expenditures deserve the 
same strict First Amendment protection that individual expenditures enjoy. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that this conflict can be explained on the ground 
that Bellotti struck down the regulation of corporate spending on ballot 
questions, while Austin’s more permissive stance toward regulation involved 
the financing of candidate elections.149 Thus, the Ninth Circuit struck down a 
Montana law allowing corporations to make expenditures on ballot initiative 
campaigns only out of a “separate segregated fund.”150  
Despite the troubling conflict between the two Supreme Court opinions, 
the Ninth Circuit was justified in refusing to hold that Austin overruled 
Bellotti, based on the principle that lower courts should “‘leav[e] to [the 
Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”151 But 
even if lower courts must read between the lines of Austin and Bellotti to 
reconcile them, the candidate-initiative distinction is not the most convincing 
explanation. The Austin Court itself did not credit this distinction with 
making a difference. Indeed, interpreting Austin as applicable only to 
candidate elections requires ignoring its basic reasoning. While it is true that 
quid pro quo corruption of elected officials presents a danger only in 
candidate elections, Austin did not rely on quid pro quo corruption as a 
justification for regulation. The Court held, rather, that regulation was 
justified by the problem of “corrosion”. “Corrosion”—the Court’s term for 
the likelihood that concentrated wealth will sway the outcome of elections—
is just as likely in the context of a ballot question as in the candidate election 
context.152  
Austin and Bellotti might be distinguished based on the relative 
restrictiveness of the regulations rather than on the distinction between 
candidate elections and ballot questions. The statute in Austin might be said 
to have been less offensive to the First Amendment because it allowed 
corporations to spend out of a segregated fund, while the Bellotti statute was 
a blanket prohibition on corporate spending.153 However, even though this 
 149. See Montana v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1050, 1055-57 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 150. Id. at 1052-53. 
 151. Id. at 1057 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).  
 152. See Argenbright, 226 F.3d at 1060-61 (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting) (citing Gerald G. 
Ashdown, Controlling Campaign Spending and the New Corruption: Waiting for the Court, 44 VAND. 
L. REV. 767, 779 (1991); David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in 
Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 252 (1991); Thomas C. Goldstein, Corporate 
Influence in Referenda: A Comment About the Prescription, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 469, 473; Jamin 
B. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign 
Finance Reform, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 393, 408). 
 153. If Austin and Bellotti are distinguished on this ground, however, the Montana law at issue in 
Argenbright, which allowed the use of segregated funds, should survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
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approach makes Austin consistent with Bellotti, it does not address the fact 
that the Austin/MCFL “corrosion” rationale conflicts with the 
antiequalization principle of Buckley. Parts IV and V of this Article will 
critique the Supreme Court’s corporate campaign finance jurisprudence and 
argue that the regulation of corporate election-related spending can be 
distinguished from the regulation of individual spending based on the 
institutional characteristics of large business corporations. This analysis 
offers a justification for the regulation of corporate spending that does not 
conflict with the antiequalization rule of Buckley. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL MODELS OF THE 
CORPORATION  
Three traditional conceptualizations of the corporation—usually referred 
to as the grant (or artificial entity) theory, the aggregation theory, and the 
personality (or natural entity) theory—historically dominated American 
corporate theory.154 As William W. Bratton and others have observed, the 
essential nature of the corporation was a common subject of discussion 
among legal theorists until the 1930s.155 Under the influence of legal realism, 
essentialist inquiry “largely ceased as the management-centered conception 
of large corporate entities took hold.”156 Although academic attention 
wandered away from the metaphysics of the nature of the corporation, the 
various essentialist models had not lost their significance in legal doctrine or 
even in scholarship.157 The traditional models, despite their conflicts with one 
another, had simply been taken for granted and quietly assimilated into legal 
discourse. This Part summarizes the traditional models. The following Part 
will criticize these models and the Court’s reliance on them in Bellotti and 
Austin. 
 Legal scholarship exhibits a faith in theoretical development by tending 
to assume that new, superior theories supplant older, discredited ones in an 
inexorable march toward the one true theory. In reality, however, old theories 
never die; they just accumulate. All three of the traditional essentialist 
See 226 F.3d at 1060-62 (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting). 
 154. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 72-74 (1992); 
Mark Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 575, 579-82 (1989); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business 
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1441-42 (1987). 
 155. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989). 
 156. Id.  
 157. See id. at 1526-27. 
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concepts of the corporation coexist simultaneously in case law and continue 
to influence courts and scholars today.158 The Supreme Court’s application of 
First Amendment analysis to corporate election-related spending 
demonstrates this simultaneous coexistence of theories.159 Although 
corporate law has developed richer models,160 the Court has continued to 
recycle the tired essentialist concepts when applying constitutional law in the 
corporate context.161 
A. Grant Theory 
Early American jurisprudence viewed a corporation as an artificial entity 
created by the state. Before the advent of modern incorporation statutes, 
legislatures created corporations individually by special legislation to 
perform a particular purpose for the public benefit.162 Because a 
corporation’s powers and its very existence were granted by special act of the 
state, courts held that the state retained the power to impose regulations on 
the corporation.163 In this century, the Court has occasionally invoked this 
grant (or artificial entity) theory to uphold state regulation of corporations 
against constitutional challenges.164 When the Court has upheld government 
 158. See id. 
 159. See infra Part IV. 
 160. See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text. 
 161. See infra Part IV. 
 162. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188, 192 (2d ed. 1985). 
 163. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (characterizing a 
corporation as an “artificial being . . . existing only in contemplation of law”). According to the 
Dartmouth College Court, a corporate charter is analogous to a contract between the corporation and 
the state. See id. at 637-38. Thus, the Court held that the state violates the Contracts Clause if it 
imposes requirements on the corporation that unilaterally alter the terms of that contract. See id. at 
705-06; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. However, the Court implied that the state would not abrogate 
the contract if it were explicitly to reserve the right to alter the contract as part of the charter or 
legislation. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. at 638-39. In response, state codes have done precisely 
that. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.02 off. cmt (rev. ed. 1999); Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 113 (1995) (citing DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 394 as an example of such a state code provision). Thus, states’ reserved powers 
now prevent corporations from invoking the Contracts Clause argument against state regulation.  
 
 164. For example, in rejecting a corporation’s Fourth Amendment challenge to a government 
search, the Court stated, “The Federal Government allows [corporations] the privilege of engaging in 
interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of 
regulation.” United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (emphasis added). The Court has 
stated that corporations, as artificial rather than natural persons, do not enjoy the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of liberty, see Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 
(1906), or of due process, see Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The Court has 
also denied corporations the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that 
they are mere “creature[s] of the state.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906). Elsewhere, however, 
the Court has contradicted itself by stating that corporations are entitled to liberty rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because they are “persons”. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 
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regulation of corporate election-related spending, its reasoning has often 
echoed the grant theory. Chief Justice Rehnquist has specifically invoked the 
grant theory, both in dissent165 and in dictum while writing for the Court,166 
to argue in favor of state regulation of election-related spending.  
The Austin opinion, authored by Justice Marshall, relied primarily on a 
version of the grant theory. The Court’s description of corporate influence as 
“corrosive” evokes “corruption,” which Buckley recognized as a state interest 
sufficient to justify regulation of political expenditures.167 However, the 
Austin Court specifically stated that the statute was not intended to fight quid 
pro quo corruption.168 Rather, the statute was concerned with limiting the 
effects of excessive corporate wealth.169 As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, 
this concern conflicts with Buckley’s rule that the state may not attempt to 
equalize relative financial influence on elections.170 The Court defended this 
deviation from Buckley on the ground that corporations amass their great 
wealth by means of a “unique state-conferred . . . structure.”171 Ultimately, 
then, corporate corrosion has nothing to do with quid pro quo corruption. 
Rather, the Austin Court relied on the grant theory, under which the state may 
regulate corporate election-related spending more closely than individual 
(1936). Cf. Gulf, Cal. & San Francisco Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (stating that corporations 
are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 165. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
grant theory applies to all nonprofit corporations, as well as business corporations). 
 166. In 1982, the Court upheld FECA’s rule that a corporation may solicit PAC contributions only 
from its “restricted class.” FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982). Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that “the special advantages that go with the 
corporate form of organization,” militate against First Amendment protection for corporate spending. 
Id. at 207. The opinion also refers to “the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and 
labor organizations,” and the “special characteristics of the corporate structure.” Id. at 209. Although 
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explicitly invoke the grant theory in National Right to Work 
Committee, he cited, United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 632, 652 (1950), one of the few 
Supreme Court opinions expressly to invoke that theory. Writing for the Court in a later opinion, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist stated in dictum that National Right to Work Committee had indeed been based on 
the grant theory. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 495 (1985) 
(citing Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209-10).  
 167. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26. “Corrosive” derives from the word 
“corrode” and not from “corrupt”. WEBSTER’S LAW DICTIONARY 455 (2d ed. 1997). But it is unlikely 
that Justice Marshall’s choice of a similar-sounding word was a mere coincidence. 
 168. 494 U.S. at 659-60.  
 169. See id. at 660. 
 170. Id. at 685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court insisted that the statute was not intended to 
equalize relative influence. 494 U.S. at 660. Such insistence, however, cannot be reconciled with the 
Court’s argument that the statute is intended to contain the effects of corporate wealth. See id. at 666. 
Most commentators agree that Austin was based on the equalization rationale forbidden by Buckley. 
See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 
(1995); BeVier, supra note 91, at 1270-71; Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign 
Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 412 (1992). 
 171. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
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spending because corporate wealth is accumulated with the special help of 
the state.172 
B. Aggregation Theory 
The aggregation theory holds that the corporations are not entities at all 
but are no more and no less than “aggregations of individuals united for some 
legitimate business.”173 As American legislatures began to charter profit-
making business corporations during the Jacksonian era, the practice of 
incorporation by special legislation came under criticism for unfairly 
granting competitive advantages to certain businesses.174 As a result, general 
incorporation supplanted special incorporation under statutes permitting 
businesses to self-incorporate without the direct involvement of the 
legislature.175 Incorporation, therefore, came to be seen as a matter of right 
rather than of privilege.176 Moreover, theorists and courts argued that the 
corporation was not an entity created by the state but was merely a set of 
private contracts like a partnership.177 Thus, in the late nineteenth century, 
courts and commentators held that the activities of a corporation are 
ultimately the activities of those individuals and that a corporation deserves 
 172. Another possible explanation of Austin is that it was intended to protect shareholders from 
management’s misappropriation of corporate wealth for political purposes without shareholder 
authorization. See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 155-56 (1998). 
However compelling this interest might be in theory, the Court’s opinion does not focus on the 
possibility that shareholders may not support management’s decisions about election-related spending. 
Rather, the Court argues that corporate expenditures fail to reflect public support. See Austin, 494 U.S. 
at 660. 
 173. San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 722, 743 (1882). With respect to the aggregation theory 
generally, see HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 69-70; Mark, supra note 154, at 1455-64. 
 174. See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 394-95 
(1954). 
 175. See id. at 417 n.28. 
 176. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 170, at 20 (“The fact that corporations are brought 
into existence by a perfunctory state filing does not justify a ‘state creation’ view any more than does 
the role of obtaining a birth certificate indicate state creation of a child.”). 
 177. See Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385 (9th Cir. 1883); San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R., 13 F. 
722 (9th Cir. 1882). Supreme Court Justice Field wrote both Southern Pacific Railroad opinions in his 
capacity as Justice for the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court, affirming these 
decisions in Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), stated without explanation that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to “all persons,” also applies to corporations. Santa Clara, 118 
U.S. at 410. Thus, Santa Clara has often been interpreted as having introduced the personality theory 
to American jurisprudence. See, e.g., Liam Seamus O’Melinn, The Sanctity of Association: The 
Corporation and Individualism in American Law, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 101, 146 (2000). However, 
most commentators agree that the opinion is better interpreted as consistent with San Mateo. See, e.g., 
HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 69-72; Charles R. O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations 
Revisited: Social and Political Expression After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 
1353-56 (1979).  
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the same constitutional protection that those individuals would enjoy if acting 
alone.178  
Bellotti is illustrative of this doctrine. The Court claimed that its 
“listeners’ interests” theory relieved it of having to decide whether corporate 
spending implicates expressive rights.179 Elsewhere in the opinion, however, 
the Court suggested a theory of corporate expressive rights based on the 
aggregation model.180 The Court argued that “corporate democracy” 
empowers shareholders to control a corporation’s spending on political 
matters.181 By treating corporate activity as the product of the individual 
agreement of its shareholders, the Court invoked the logic of the aggregation 
theory.  
C. Personality Theory  
The third traditional model of the corporation is based on the idea of 
corporate personality. According to this theory, a corporation is neither the 
creation of the state nor merely the sum of its individual human constituents. 
It is a “natural entity” distinct from its members and is thus entitled to all the 
legal rights of a human person.182 The Supreme Court treats corporations as 
the equivalent of human persons for some constitutional purposes.183 For 
example, it has referred to corporations as “persons” protected under the 
 178. For example, the Santa Clara Court stated: 
Whenever a provision of the [C]onstitution or of a law guaranties to persons protection in their 
property, or affords to them the means for its protection, or prohibits injurious legislation affecting 
it, the benefits of the provision or law are extended to corporations; not to the name under which 
different persons are united, but to the individuals composing the union.  
Santa Clara, 18 F. at 402 (emphasis added). See also HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 90-91 
(citing nineteenth century treatise writers). 
 More specifically, Justice Field argued that individuals who are associated in the form of 
corporations deserved the same legal protections as individuals who are not. See Santa Clara, 18 F. at 
401. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection to “all persons” protects 
corporations because a corporation’s members are persons, not because a corporation is itself a person 
under the Constitution. 
 179. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788-92. 
 180. See id. at 794-95. 
 181. Id. at 794. 
 182. See HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 101. 
 183. For the proposition that corporations are entitled to Fifth Amendment double jeopardy and 
Fourth Amendment constitutional protections see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. 
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 
353 (1977)). In addition, the U.S. Code instructs courts to presume that federal statutes intend to give 
the same treatment to corporations and human persons. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1997) (Dictionary Act) (“In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . . the words 
‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.184 The Court has also stated without elaboration that 
business corporations have negative speech rights—the right against being 
compelled to express a viewpoint—equivalent to those of individual 
persons.185 The idea of the corporation as a person has become so deeply 
ingrained in our legal culture that it continues to thrive in law.186 In some 
constitutional contexts, however, the Court has described corporations as 
artificial entities undeserving of constitutional protection.187 Thus it is 
impossible to say as a general matter whether corporations are persons under 
the Constitution. All that can be said is that they are persons in some 
constitutional contexts but not in others. 
The Bellotti Court made use of the aggregation metaphor and invoked the 
rhetoric of corporate personality. For example, it stated that the government 
may not “dictat[e] the subjects about which persons may speak and the 
speakers who may address a public issue.”188 Furthermore, the Court cited 
the Buckley principle that the state may not “restrict the speech of some 
elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.”189 By 
doing so, the Court suggested that corporations are “elements of society” 
equivalent to individuals in public discourse.190 
 184. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Grosjean, v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233 (1936). Cf. Gulf, Cal. & San Francisco Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (“It is well settled 
that corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States.”). See also John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The 
Misuse of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 142 
(Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987). 
 185. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (striking down on 
First Amendment grounds a law requiring utility company to include in its billing envelopes messages 
from a ratepayers’ group).  
 186. As Mark Hager states:  
Despite the demise of formalism, . . . legal concepts continue to exert their force as they have 
always done, as metaphors, symbols, images, and visions of social existence . . . . Attacks on the 
logical deficiencies of legal conceptualizations often carry little force precisely because the 
‘meaning’ of legal concepts does not lie primarily in their logical implications to begin with.  
Hager, supra note 154, at 576. Cf. Mark, supra note 154, at 1482 (“Personification . . . had proved to 
be a potent symbol to legitimate the autonomous business corporation and its management.”). 
 187. See cases cited supra note 164. 
 188. 435 U.S. at 784-85 (citing Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)) (emphasis added). 
The Court further argued that allowing the state to limit business corporations’ speech to issues of 
business concerns would lead inevitably to limits on the permissible topics of speech for “religious, 
charitable, or civic” corporations. Id. at 784. 
 189. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790-91 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49). 
 190. Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (“For corporations as 
for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say.”).  
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V. THE FLAWS OF THE TRADITIONAL MODELS AS APPLIED TO ELECTION-
RELATED SPENDING 
Constitutional jurisprudence in the libertarian tradition envisions an 
individual asserting her interests against those of society. The personality and 
aggregation metaphors attempt to apply the libertarian individual paradigm to 
the constitutional protection of corporations. However, when applied to 
corporations, constitutional jurisprudence has failed to grasp the ways in 
which the corporation differs from the individual.191 Because the corporation 
is by nature not individual but divisible, the libertarian individualist paradigm 
is a poor fit.  
All three of the traditional corporate models—personality, aggregation, 
and grant—fail to grasp the central insight of contemporary corporate law, 
namely that a corporation is not a monolithic actor but a complex set of 
relationships.192 Shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, the state, and 
others negotiate and compete for the corporation’s resources. Contemporary 
corporate theories proceed from the insight of corporate complexity, 
although they draw differing conclusions from it. They share as their central 
concern the issue of who legitimately controls corporate resources and the 
source of that legitimacy. According to the standard contemporary model of 
corporate law, corporate managers are the fiduciaries of shareholders, who 
are the true owners of corporate resources.193 Unlike the aggregation model, 
the standard contemporary model does not presume that shareholders directly 
control the acts of the corporation.194 Rather, management has wide 
discretion to operate the corporation for the shareholders’ benefit subject 
only to legal prohibitions against abuses of this discretion.195  
The contractarian view of the firm—the new orthodoxy in academic 
circles—holds that corporate resources are efficiently allocated among 
management, shareholders, and other parties through consensual bargaining 
 191. The grant model refuses to treat corporations like individuals, but it simply asserts that the 
state has special authority to regulate corporations and fails to explain why. 
 192. See, e.g., G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 887, 890-98 (2000) (describing the dominant contemporary models as focusing on certain 
relationships but proposing a broader focus on a greater number of relationships). Of course, the 
smaller a corporation and its business, the fewer and less complex its relationships. 
 193. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (noting that “from the traditional legal 
viewpoint, a corporation’s directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder 
wealth”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders”). 
 194. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1428-29 (1985). 
 195. See CLARK, supra note 193, at 123. 
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and not through state involvement.196 This view superficially resembles the 
aggregation model in holding that a corporation is at heart an agreement 
among its constituent individuals.197 The contractarian view is more 
sophisticated, however, in that it attempts to articulate the mechanisms by 
which constituents reach agreement as to the terms of corporate 
governance.198 That mechanism is by “contract,” which is variously defined 
as an agreement by literal bargaining and by “hypothetical bargaining.”199 
Unlike the traditional theories, both the standard contemporary and 
contractarian models focus on balancing the conflicting interests within a 
corporation.200 Constitutional law, however, has tended to ignore this central 
issue. The Supreme Court’s analysis of corporate election-related spending 
has followed the traditional flawed models and remains mired in the archaic 
monolithic view of the corporation. Corporate governance law gives 
shareholders some formal structures for input into management decisions, 
but as this section will argue, those structures are mostly empty formalities.  
A. Personality Theory 
Under the personality metaphor, a corporation, like a person, is a moral 
actor with a unitary will. The legal realists convinced American 
academicians to abandon the personality metaphor by the 1930s.201 As John 
Dewey argued in 1926, the idea of corporate personality as a basis for rights 
is rooted more in terminological sleight-of-hand than reasoned argument.202 
A corporation is obviously not a person in the normal sense of the word. The 
 196. The classic manifesto of the contractarian view of the firm is FRANK N. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For a brief and critical 
history of the ascent of the contractarian model, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the 
Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 820-22 
(1999). 
 197. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 16-17. 
 198. See id. at 15-22. 
 199. The former approach is summarized in EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 18-19, 
the latter in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique 
of Progressive Corporate Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 864-65 & n.31 (1997). 
 200. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 4-6. 
 201. See Mark, supra note 154, at 1478-83. Mark Hager rejects the logic and metaphysics of the 
personality theory, but nonetheless perceptively (if somewhat cynically) notes that its rhetorical power 
can be manipulated for political ends. Hager, supra note 154, at 576-77. 
 202. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 
(1926). Deliberate misdirection may have also played a part. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, some 
attorneys argued (perhaps disingenuously) that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had inserted 
the term “person” into the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (as distinct from the term 
“citizen” in the Privileges and Immunities Clause) specifically to include “artificial persons” or 
corporations. That “conspiracy theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment was convincingly discredited in 
the 1930s. See Graham, supra note 177, at 371-74. 
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fact that the same word is applied to corporations and humans in some 
contexts does not explain why the two deserve the same moral status in any 
given context.203 As applied to a corporation, the word “person” served as “a 
kind of legal shorthand” intended only to simplify the joint treatment of a 
group of investors and their property.204 Semantic sleight-of-hand 
insufficiently justifies treating corporations like human beings under the 
Constitution.205 Thus, while the Bellotti Court correctly stated that the First 
Amendment limits the government’s ability to restrict the speech of 
“persons”206 the Court made an unjustifiable leap of logic in suggesting that 
the same limitation applies to the regulation of corporations. 
B. Aggregation Theory 
The mistake of treating the corporation like an individual also appears in 
more subtle form in the aggregation theory. The aggregation theory views a 
corporation as a group of individuals, and thus it superficially acknowledges 
the multiple constituents involved in a corporation. The theory, however, 
ignores the competing interests in the corporation and conclusorily asserts 
that all corporate activity is by definition the product of agreement among 
these diverse constituents.207 The theory does not describe the mechanism by 
which these diverse constituents supposedly reach agreement. By 
unrealistically presuming that the corporation’s multiple constituents act in 
unity and by using this description as the basis for constitutional protection, 
the aggregation theory attempts to rationalize treating the corporation as the 
functional equivalent of an individual and its rights as the equivalent of 
individual rights. 
As Justice Field articulated in the 1880s, the aggregation model viewed 
the corporation as made up of individual “members” who created, owned, 
and operated an enterprise.208 By the time Justice Field and others developed 
 203. See Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporation 
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835 (1997).  
 While the Realists showed how corporate rights are not natural or inherent, they did not attempt to 
explain, as a normative matter, why society should not recognize corporate rights. Meir Dan-Cohen 
has attempted to fill this gap with a Kantian argument that characterizes the corporation as a mere 
“instrumentality”. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 199-200 (1986).  
 204. Mark, supra note 154, at 1447. 
 205. Indeed, one commentator has argued that corporations should not be recognized as 
constitutional actors without a constitutional amendment to that effect. See Carl J. Mayer, 
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990). 
 206. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85. 
 207. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text. 
 208. Thus Justice Field used the terms “member” and “corporator” synonymously. See Santa 
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the aggregation theory, however, giant public corporations had already begun 
to dominate the economy.209 Field’s idealized harmonious “corporators” may 
exist in some small, closely held corporations, but not in the large, modern 
corporation. Unlike Field’s active corporate “members”, most shareholders 
of large public corporations are passive participants.210 They own the 
corporation in a formal, attenuated sense, but they typically have nothing to 
do with the founding or operation of the corporation. The shareholders did 
not join the corporation to participate in its business; instead, they purchased 
shares in the secondary market for investment purposes. They are atomized 
and dispersed, and cannot even readily identify one another.  
In modern terminology, the original aggregation theory failed to take into 
account the issue of agency costs. Corporate acts are not actually performed 
by individuals acting in concert but by managers and employees purporting 
to represent the corporation.211 The group cannot realistically approve every 
one of these acts, so some of these acts will not actually represent the 
interests of the group. This agency cost issue is the orthodox rationale for 
state involvement in corporate governance. The fiduciary model of corporate 
law holds that the state is justified in imposing fiduciary duties upon 
managers in order to counter the danger of managers pursuing their own self-
interest ahead of shareholder interests.212  
Clara, 18 F. at 403. 
 209. See HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 92-93. Furthermore, the theory was incompatible with 
corporate powers such as limited liability and perpetual existence, which cannot be created by private 
action. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839) (holding that individuals 
associated in a corporation may not demand all the rights of individuals if the state grants them 
freedom from some of their liabilities); HORWITZ, supra note 154, at 93-100 (arguing that the limited 
liability dilemma contributed to the demise of the original aggregation theory in turn of the century 
American jurisprudence); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. But see 
Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 
(1995) (arguing that a firm could achieve the equivalent of limited liability, even with respect to 
involuntary creditors, through contract rather than incorporation).  
 Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel acknowledge that limited liability allows 
corporations to shift costs to involuntary creditors. However, they fail to explain why limited liability 
contributes to efficient resource allocation, other than to say that the cost is mitigated by corporations’ 
incentives to purchase insurance. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 52-53. 
 210. See Mark, supra note 154, at 1447 (stating that most owners of corporations were actively 
involved in corporate affairs until the rise of publicly held industrial corporations in the 1890s). 
 211. Representative democracy has similar agency costs. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional 
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 465 (1989) (observing that the “dualist” strand of 
constitutionalism “distinguish[es] the will of We the People of the United States from the acts of We 
the Normally Elected Politicians of the United States”). 
 212. See Brudney, supra note 194, at 1431 (“[E]xternally imposed legal strictures—such as the 
classic fiduciary categorical prohibitions against self-dealing—are . . . a way of restraining managerial 
diversion of assets.”). Contractarianism also concerns itself with agency costs. Under the contractarian 
view, however, the law need not “protect” shareholders in allocating agency costs, because contractual 
bargaining yields optimal allocations. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss1/1
p 1 Joo.doc  7/17/01   1:50 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] THE MODERN CORPORATION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 37 
 
 
 
 
 
By using “listeners’ interests” as a basis for protecting corporate 
spending, the Bellotti Court appeared to take an encouraging step beyond 
conclusory traditional models of the corporation.213 Nonetheless, Bellotti’s 
approach is unsatisfactory because ultimately, it too falls back on a 
traditional monolithic model of action within the corporation.214 The Bellotti 
Court considered only listeners’ interests. The state had argued that 
protection of corporate political spending may conflict with the other primary 
First Amendment value—protecting individual expression—by using 
shareholders’ money to support views with which they disagree.215 In 
summarily dismissing this argument, the Court, like the aggregation theorists, 
assumed without analysis that corporate acts are the product of agreement 
among the members of the corporation and are in effect the product of a 
uniform corporate will. The Court refused to believe that management can 
control election-related spending without shareholder support.216 It assumed 
that corporate acts express the will of the shareholders because such acts are 
made through an undefined process the Court termed “corporate 
democracy.”217 The Court suggested that managers, shareholders, and the 
public uniformly supported corporate spending, while the state arbitrarily 
sought to suppress it.218 This assumption masks the differences within a 
corporation, as well as the potential conflicts between the public and various 
corporate constituencies. 
C. Grant Theory 
Like the other two traditional theories, the grant theory also fails to 
consider the various relationships that make up the corporation. It 
simplistically focuses on only two parties: the state and the corporation.219 
But the state, like the corporation, represents multiple interests. State interests 
include both societal interests and the protection of individual interests 
against society or other individuals. The grant theory’s bald assertion of state 
power to regulate corporations does not take into account the state’s 
multifaceted interests. 
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1990).  
 213. 435 U.S. at 788-92. 
 214. The absence of expressive rights in corporate political spending undermines the listeners’ 
interest argument in favor of First Amendment protection. See infra Part VII. 
 215. 435 U.S. at 792-93. 
 216. See id. at 794-95 & n.34. 
 217. Id. at 794. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See supra Part IV.C. 
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In contrast to the aggregation and personality theories, however, the grant 
theory distinguishes the corporation from the individual.220 Just as the 
aggregation and personality theories leap to the conclusion that corporations 
are like individuals for constitutional purposes, the grant theory is little more 
than a conclusory assertion that corporations differ from individuals. It falls 
short of furnishing a satisfactory explanation of why they differ. In addition, 
the grant theory disagrees with existing constitutional doctrine. The theory’s 
premise that incorporation is a state-granted privilege does not lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that the state may regulate all aspects of the 
corporation. While the state may burden First Amendment rights as a 
condition of state privileges in some instances, it may not do so in all 
cases.221 The outcome in a given case depends on a case-specific balancing 
of the value of the speech against the state’s interest in attaching conditions 
to the privilege.222  
Although the Court in Austin relied primarily on the conclusory reasoning 
of the grant theory, it made some attempt to explain how corporations differ 
from individuals by using the three factors from MCFL: (1) the corporation’s 
purpose, (2) its members’ disincentive to dissociate if they disagree with the 
corporation’s political activities, and (3) its relationship to business 
corporations.223 The first two factors recognize some of the ways in which a 
corporation involves multiple and sometimes conflicting interests.224 The 
Austin Court, however, failed to explain why these distinctions should make 
a constitutional difference. Rather, the Austin Court proceeded from the 
conclusion that the state may regulate the spending of business 
corporations.225 It held MCFL exempt from regulation because it did not 
resemble a business corporation in these three ways, while the Chamber of 
Commerce was subject to regulation because it did.226 
 220. See id. 
 221. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 
(1972) (noting that the state “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes . . . his 
interest in freedom of speech”). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989). 
 222. Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (invalidating a public school’s 
dismissal of a teacher for criticizing school policies that were a matter of legitimate public concern), 
with Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (upholding a district attorney’s dismissal of an employee 
for questioning superiors and thereby disrupting the work of the office).  
 223. See supra Part III.D. 
 224. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 662-63. The third factor is of little substance because it merely begs 
the question of whether election-related spending by business corporations is appropriate.  
 225. 494 U.S. at 661. 
 226. Id. at 661-62. 
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VI. MOVING BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL MODELS: RECOGNIZING THE 
REALITIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Constitutional analysis should not simply assume that the acts of a 
corporation represent the expression of its constituent individuals, as the 
Bellotti Court did.227 Dissenting in Bellotti, Justice White asserted that 
corporate spending does not express the preferences of shareholders,228 but 
he did not directly counter the majority’s assertion that shareholders control 
decisions through “corporate democracy.”229 Justice White’s assertion that 
corporate spending does not represent shareholder interests was as 
conclusory as the majority’s insistence that it does.230  
Instead of jumping to either of these conclusions, constitutional law 
should use the insights of corporate law to ask whether corporate spending 
implicates individuals’ expressive rights.231 Neither the majority nor the 
dissent examined the actual institutional characteristics of the appellant232 
corporations in Bellotti. The justices simply analyzed them as generic 
corporations. The opinion neither considers nor mentions whether they were 
small enterprises or large, publicly traded corporations.233 In fact, they were 
among the nation’s largest business corporations and banks: First National 
Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National Bank, Gillette Co., 
 227. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778-83. 
 228. See id. at 805-06. 
 229. Compare id. at 794, with id. at 815 (White, J., dissenting). 
 230. See id. at 804-07. 
 231. Cf. DAN-COHEN, supra note 203, at 110 (arguing that because corporate speech rights derive 
from individual rights, corporate speech may be regulated in the interests of better serving individual 
rights); Bezanson, supra note 6, at 790-91 (arguing that an organization’s political speech deserves the 
same First Amendment protection as its members’ individual speech, if the speech “represents its 
members’ own choice, as individuals, to communicate to others information on selected types of 
topics, decided upon through an established and participatory or consultative process”). 
 Even if an organization’s speech is equivalent to the speech of individuals, the First Amendment 
interest in protecting the speech must be viewed in the context of countervailing societal interests. First 
Amendment doctrine reflects this idea by allowing compelling state interests to justify some burdens 
on free speech. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (“Even a ‘significant interference’ with protected rights . . . 
may be sustained if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest . . . .”).  
 232. The corporations were “appellants” rather than “petitioners”. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765. 
Appeals of right to the Supreme Court were largely eliminated by the Supreme Court Case Selection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). See also Diane P. Wood, Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
and the Responsibility of Judging, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 11, 13 (1998) (explaining the shift from 
mandatory to discretionary Supreme Court review). 
 233. When Bellotti was argued before the Supreme Judicial Court in 1976, both Digital 
Equipment and Gillette Co. were publicly traded, and their stock valuations were the nation’s 70th and 
121st highest, respectively. See The Forbes Market 500, FORBES, May 15, 1976, at 152. Wyman-
Gordon stock was first offered to the public in 1978. See Wyman Gordan Company, available at 
LEXIS, NEXUS Library, Company & Financial, Company Profiles & Directories, Individual 
Publications, Hoover’s Company Profile Database.  
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Digital Equipment Corp., and Wyman-Gordon Co.234 In addition, both 
Justice White and the majority considered only the interests of shareholders, 
and not those of other corporate constituents, who are completely 
disenfranchised by “corporate democracy.”235 
Rather than relying on the easy assumption that a corporation’s acts 
express its constituents’ preferences as the Bellotti Court did, a court could 
undertake another approach and employ an intense factual inquiry for each 
given speech act by each given organization. A court would have to 
determine both how the organization in question actually reached a given 
decision to make a political expenditure, and to what extent it considered its 
members’ concerns in that decision. While this idea may work in principle 
because it requires the speech to truly reflect the will of individuals, the 
required fact-finding would be terribly cumbersome in practice. Courts 
should therefore stake out a middle ground between conclusory assumptions 
on the one hand, and an unmanageable individualized empirical approach on 
the other. 
Large business corporations share significant and similar organizational 
characteristics because of the common default form of their internal 
management. State corporate laws and federal securities laws prescribe 
default governance norms for publicly traded business corporations.236 These 
default norms tend to favor wealth creation over individuals’ participation237 
and thus justify presumptions that corporate spending does not reflect the 
expression of individual shareholders.238 The remainder of this Part will 
 234. The opinion only lists the names of the corporations in a footnote. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 
768 n.1. Although then Justice Rehnquist mentioned in passing that two of the appellant corporations 
were not state-chartered corporations but federally chartered banks, neither the majority nor any of the 
dissents assigned significance to this fact. See id. at 824 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Digital and 
Wyman-Gordon were incorporated in Massachusetts, and Gillette was incorporated in Delaware. Id. 
See First Nat’l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977). 
 235. With respect to nonshareholder constituents, see infra Part VI.F. 
 236. Many provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), including section 14, 
discussed infra, apply only to securities that are required to register under that Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 
(2000). The 1934 Act does not require registration by corporations whose stock is not traded on a 
national exchange, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 12(a), 78c(a)(1), or whose assets do not exceed $10 million. See 
Securities Exchange Act Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2001). Thus, much of federal securities 
law that impacts corporate governance does not apply to small, thinly traded corporations. 
 237. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 289 (1980) (arguing that the separation of ownership and control is efficient); Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982) (criticizing the movement 
toward increased shareholder participation); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share 
Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1440-41 (1964) (arguing that the costs of shareholder participation 
outweigh the benefits). 
 238. See Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1002. A given corporation could rebut the presumption by 
showing that it has modified the default rules such that election-related spending is expressive of the 
will of the shareholders. For example, a corporate charter could state a specific ideological agenda as 
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describe the limitations on shareholder participation in decisions about a 
corporation’s election-related spending. So-called “corporate democracy” 
does not give shareholders meaningful input into such decisions, much less 
control over them.239 The default corporate governance regime gives 
shareholder voting very limited power. Even to the extent that shareholders 
can challenge management’s decisions, federal and state law fail to guarantee 
shareholder access to information about such decisions.240 Meaningful 
opposition to management decisions requires the owners of large numbers of 
shares to band together. Collective action problems, such as the limited 
opportunities for shareholders to communicate with one another, limit 
successful shareholder organization. Finally, while dissatisfied shareholders 
may dissociate from a corporation by the sale of shares, there are constraints 
on their ability to exercise this option.241 
This Part’s discussion of shareholder participation demonstrates both 
shareholders’ lack of participation in publicly traded corporations and the 
necessity of distinguishing publicly traded corporations from smaller 
corporations. As Melvin Eisenberg notes, publicly traded corporations and 
closely held corporations are “two types of business associations which may 
have little in common but their form.”242 In the simplest case, a corporation 
may be owned, managed, and operated by a single individual. In such a case, 
the corporation’s election-related spending may, quite literally, be that 
individual’s expressive act. Shareholders may also participate more actively, 
and with less severe collective action problems, in corporations with a small 
number of shareholders. While shareholders of a public corporation are 
atomized and generally have no interactions with one another, the few 
shareholders of a closely held corporation are often “closely associated 
persons.”243 Thus, they are more likely to have the opportunities to 
one of the purposes of the corporation, or if a corporation reaches political positions by a participatory 
democratic process involving shareholders. Among publicly traded corporations, however, such cases 
will be rare or nonexistent. 
 239. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 240. See infra Part VI.B. 
 241. The two shareholder tactics of attempting to influence management on the one hand and 
divesting from the corporation on the other fall into Albert Hirschman’s categories of “voice” and 
“exit” respectively. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 46 (1970). 
 242. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 
(1976).  
 Although the Bellotti Court acknowledged the existence of differences between large and small 
corporations, 435 U.S. at 785-86 n.22, 793, it was not referring to the differences in governing 
structures and individual participation. Rather, the Court’s point was to argue that the diversity of size 
may contribute to ideological diversity in the election-related spending of various corporations. See id. 
at 785.  
 243. EISENBERG, supra note 242, at 5. 
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communicate directly with management and other shareholders and to 
bargain explicitly for participatory rights, simply by virtue of the small size 
of the organization.244  
Some state laws expressly permit closely held corporations to depart from 
certain corporate governance norms and give shareholders a more direct say 
in corporate decision making.245 Furthermore, some jurisdictions employ a 
“partnership analogy” which requires the governance of small corporations to 
be more responsive to shareholder concerns than that of large corporations.246 
While modification of corporate law default rules is at least theoretically 
possible in all corporations, the option of statutory close corporation status 
and judicially created rules favoring the partnership analogy reduce the 
transaction costs of contracting for participatory management in a small 
corporation.  
None of this is meant to suggest that small corporations operate as 
harmoniously as Justice Field’s hypothetical “aggregation,”247 but active 
shareholder involvement is at least a possibility in smaller corporations. In 
the large, public corporation, however, collective action problems created by 
the sheer number of shareholders can impose insurmountable transaction 
costs to contracting around default rules that discourage participation. Thus, 
courts should presume that speech does not constitute the expression of 
individuals with publicly traded corporations but should presume the 
opposite with closely held corporations.248 
A. Shareholder Voting 
The corporate governance regime severely limits shareholders’ 
opportunities to express their disagreement to management. Dissenting in 
Austin, Justice Scalia dismissed the idea that shareholders might justifiably 
object to management’s political speech.249 According to Justice Scalia, 
every shareholder “knows that management may take any action that is 
 244. See O’Kelley, supra note 177, at 1363. 
 245. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (1999).  
 246. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 
1975). But see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (rejecting this concept in Delaware). 
See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 
699 (1993). 
 247. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. 
 248. This typology admittedly leaves a vast middle ground of medium-sized and large nonpublic 
corporations. For such a corporation, a presumption is harder to justify without some specific facts 
about the corporation’s size and governance structure. Nonpublic corporations that have large numbers 
of passive shareholders and follow the default rules of nonparticipatory governance should be treated 
like public corporations. 
 
 249. See 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a specified supermajority) of 
the shareholders[’] wishes, so long as that action is designed to make a profit. 
That is the deal.”250 This passage suggests that shareholders are entitled to 
vote on corporate actions, but corporate decisions are based on a majority 
vote of shareholders only in very rare instances. While shareholders have the 
right to vote,251 they may vote only on a limited range of subjects.252 Under 
the default rules of state corporate law, directors, not shareholders, manage a 
corporation, unless its incorporating documents provide otherwise.253 Even a 
majority of shareholders may not make business decisions on behalf of the 
corporation or order changes in management policies. This rule can be 
altered by provisions in the corporate chartering documents.254 This might 
appear to enable shareholders to increase their role in the decision making 
process. However, while shareholders must approve amendments to the 
corporate charter, amendments may normally be put to a shareholder vote 
only upon a resolution by the board of directors.255  
 250. Id. 
 251. The usual structure of corporate governance is one share, one vote. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1999). A corporation can issue classes of shares that have more or less than one 
vote each. See, e.g., id. 
 Large, publicly traded corporations may not take away existing shareholder voting rights because 
New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ rules place significant limits on 
the ability of their listed corporations to do so. See Order Granting Approval to Rule Changes Relating 
to the Exchanges’ and Association’s Rules Regarding Shareholder Voting Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,570 
(Dec. 19, 1994) [hereinafter SEC Order]. However, the exchanges are free to change these rules 
because the SEC does not have the power to mandate a one vote per share requirement. The D.C. 
Circuit struck down such an SEC rule on the ground that it exceeded the SEC’s statutory authority. See 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The D.C. Circuit held that the 
regulation of shareholder suffrage is a matter for state corporation law. See id. at 412-13. The 
exchanges voluntarily adopted their rules against disenfranchisement following the Business 
Roundtable case. See SEC Order, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66, 570. The NYSE has made clear, however, that it 
considers its one-vote requirement flexible and subject to change. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future 
of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 346-47 (2001). 
 252. In general, shareholders vote only for directors, not for corporate actions or policies. See, 
e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 195 (2000). Shareholders have the right to approve 
or reject certain rare, fundamental corporate changes recommended by the directors, such as 
dissolution of the corporation, mergers, or the sale of all or substantially all corporate assets. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271 (1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 11.03(b), 12.01-02 (rev. ed. 
1999). However, “because there is usually more than one way to skin the corporate cat, directors often 
can restructure transactions to achieve their desired end without triggering a shareholder vote.” 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247, 311-12 (1999). 
 253. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).  
 254. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b). 
 255. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b). The requirement 
that the Board initiate amendments is a mandatory rule. Delaware’s statute reads, “Every amendment 
. . . shall be made and effected in the following manner: (1) if the corporation has capital stock, its 
board shall adopt a resolution . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b). The MBCA states, “For the 
amendment to be adopted: (1) the board of directors must recommend the amendment to the 
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Shareholders’ primary voting role is the election of directors.256  In 
addition to electing directors, shareholders may remove them by vote.257 It is 
often argued that a shareholder who disagrees with a specific act of corporate 
conduct may discipline management by subsequently mobilizing votes 
against incumbent directors.258 Such arguments, however, greatly overstate 
the power of the shareholder vote.259  
Mobilizing votes is rarely a realistic option, because incumbent 
management usually runs for re-election unopposed.260 As a practical matter, 
shareholders have little control over the nomination process. A diversified 
shareholder faces an immense number of potential board candidates and is 
unlikely to have the time or expertise to identify and evaluate them.261  
Furthermore, a single shareholder typically has a negligible proportion of 
votes in the corporation. Even the largest institutional investors typically do 
not hold nearly enough shares to control board seats on their own.262 
Effective voting against incumbent management requires coalition-building 
among many diverse shareholders who are geographically dispersed and 
difficult to identify.  By giving management control of corporate resources 
and decision making, the default corporate governance regime effectively 
subsidizes management’s power to advance its positions while restricting 
shareholders’ ability to do the same. Finally, even if shareholders can muster 
the votes to remove incumbents, they must wait months to do so, because 
elections are usually held annually.263 The so-called “Wall Street Rule” holds 
shareholders . . . .” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b). 
 256. See supra note 252. Directors’ fiduciary duties require them to serve the shareholder 
interests. However, “shareholder interests” as defined by corporate law are not necessarily the same as 
the interests of actual shareholders. See infra Part VI.E. 
 257. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k). Even when directors are removed by shareholder 
vote, shareholders do not have control over their replacement. The Delaware code gives the remaining 
directors the power to fill vacancies on the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223. The MBCA 
creates the possibility of a power struggle by providing that vacancies may be filled by either the 
shareholders or the directors. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.10. 
 258. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: 
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 274-76 (1998). 
Corporate officers, unlike directors, are generally appointed by the board of directors and are not 
normally elected or removed by shareholders. See GEVURTZ, supra note 252, at 181. 
 259. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 252, at 311 (“[S]hareholders in public corporations 
do not in any realistic sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves.”). 
 260. See GEVURTZ, supra note 252, at 187. 
 261. See Mark Latham, Corporate Monitoring: New Shareholder Power Tool, 54 FIN. ANALYSTS 
J., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 9. 
 262. See Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate 
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 42 (1993). 
 263. See Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1012 (1999). 
If the directors’ terms are staggered, shareholders will have to wait through two election cycles. See id. 
Many firms limit the ability of nondirectors to call special meetings. See id. 
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that it is more efficient for dissenting shareholders to sell their shares than to 
attempt to mobilize opposition to management.264  
The barriers to shareholder collective action mean that management faces 
few limitations on its ability to mobilize large amounts of money for political 
expenditures. Because the board of directors manages the corporation, 
corporate law gives the board of directors ultimate control over “corporate” 
activity permitted by election law, such as contributing to political parties or 
nonfederal candidates, making independent expenditures on initiative 
campaigns, and establishing and administering PACs.265 Corporate law also 
limits shareholders’ ability to oppose management’s decisions on these 
matters or to directly control such matters. Upper management, a relatively 
small, structured group, faces lower organizing costs. Shareholders as a 
group, or like-minded subsets of shareholders, have very high organizing 
costs (including identifying other shareholders and determining which of 
those are like-minded). The division of powers between management and 
shareholders, then, in effect, subsidizes the organization costs of management 
but not those of shareholders. Thus, only management can easily and 
inexpensively participate in decisions such as those regarding political 
expenditures. Because shareholders are effectively excluded from the 
process, the collective shareholder group makes no decision at all. Rather, a 
tiny subset of the group makes all decisions with minimal accountability to 
the rest of the group. 
In addition to their voting power with respect to the election of directors 
and extraordinary matters, shareholders may propose and vote on 
resolutions.266 Such resolutions, however, must be made in precatory form—
that is, they are mere suggestions that management take a particular action. 
Under the default rules of corporate governance, shareholders may not make 
 264. See Bogus, supra note 262, at 42. According to Albert Hirschman, the “best-informed” 
shareholders are most likely to practice the Wall Street Rule. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 241, at 46-
47 (“Those customers [sic] who care most about the quality of the product [sic] and who, therefore, are 
those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also 
those who are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterioration.”). 
 Under the interest group theory of politics, “[g]roups will participate in an institution when the 
benefits of participation exceed the costs. The costs are primarily the costs of obtaining information 
about institutional processes and of organizing for collective action. The benefits are whatever benefits 
the institution can supply to the group.” Howard S. Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional 
Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 967 (1997) (reviewing and citing NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 8 (1994)). While controlling the corporation potentially offers great benefits, the organizing 
costs for dispersed shareholders are immense. 
 265. With respect to the corporation’s authority to perform these acts under election law, see 
supra Part II. 
 266. See GEVURTZ, supra note 252, at 264. 
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binding resolutions ordering management to take a specific course of action 
or adopt a policy because, as noted above, corporation codes provide that 
directors shall manage the corporation.267  
B. Shareholder Access to Corporate Information 
As the previous section shows, the power of the shareholder vote is 
inherently limited. Corporate law further constrains shareholders’ ability to 
use their votes meaningfully and to participate in corporate decision making 
because it limits shareholders’ access to information about the corporation’s 
political expenditures. Large gaps in the scope of required disclosure in this 
area mean that management need not even inform shareholders of many 
kinds of corporate political activity. The rational apathy of the diversified 
portfolio investor makes it unlikely that she will go to the lengths necessary 
to seek out such information.268 Moreover, corporations fall under two kinds 
of relevant disclosure requirements—disclosure to the FEC under federal 
campaign law and disclosure directly to shareholders. The latter is governed 
by both state corporation and federal securities law. Neither body of law 
provides shareholders with all the information necessary to police the 
corporation’s political involvement. 
1. Federal Law 
Federal law subjects corporations to two different types of mandatory 
disclosure. First, federal election law requires some disclosure to the FEC by 
all political spenders, whether corporate or individual. Second, federal 
securities law requires corporations to make certain disclosures to 
shareholders. 
FECA requires that corporations and individuals alike make certain 
disclosures to the FEC regarding election-related spending. As enacted, the 
statute demanded disclosure of contributions and expenditures made “for the 
purpose of . . . influencing” the nomination or election of candidates for 
 267. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (rev. ed. 1999).  
 268. With respect to shareholder apathy generally, see Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity 
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 522 (1990). The fact that a shareholder may not want the 
information does not undermine this Article’s basic argument. The default structure does not involve a 
shareholder’s input with respect to political issues because it is focused on profit not politics. If a 
shareholder is happy with that arrangement, then management betrays a shareholder by using 
corporate funds for purely political and nonpecuniary purposes. If, on the other hand, management’s 
political expenditures are indeed an efficient method of increasing corporate profits, then management 
runs squarely into the problem of corruption. 
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public office.269 In Buckley, however, the Supreme Court held that the phrase 
“for the purpose of . . . influencing” was impermissibly vague.270 The Court 
ruled that while expenditures made specifically to advocate for a candidate 
may be included under the statute’s reporting requirement, expenditures in 
connection with issue advocacy may not.271  
Corporations can easily defeat even the surviving disclosure requirements 
with respect to the support of candidates. As noted above, corporations may 
make donations to organizations that serve as conduits of funds to political 
causes, including candidate elections.272 Because the corporation’s donation 
to the conduit is not nominally related to candidate advocacy, it need not be 
disclosed under FECA.273 Furthermore, as noted above, the line between 
issue advocacy and express candidate advocacy is a fine one.274 
Finally, and perhaps most important, even when information is properly 
reported to FECA, shareholders depend on the FEC to disseminate that 
information to the public. FECA requires the FEC to archive disclosure 
reports and to make them available for public inspection and copying.275 The 
Commission, however, often fails to perform its duties,276 and the FEC 
public disclosure office is understaffed and underfunded.277 Cass Sunstein 
argues that the structure of FECA itself shows that Congress “concluded that 
the [FEC] . . . is not entirely reliable on its own and that relevant people 
should have access to the courts in order to ensure that the (democratically 
enacted) law is enforced.”278  
In addition to FECA’s requirements regarding disclosure to the FEC, the 
federal securities laws mandate certain types of disclosures to shareholders 
and the SEC. The Securities Act requires corporations to disclose certain 
 269. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976). 
 270. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-82. The section of FECA, as amended in light of Buckley, now 
appears at 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1) (2000). See Hill, supra note 72, at 910 n.131. 
 271. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. 
 272. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 273. See Hill, supra note 72, at 911, 922-34.  
 274. See supra Parts II.B.1, 3. 
 275. See 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)-(6) (1999).  
 276. See Benjamin Weiser & Bill McAllister, The Little Agency that Can’t, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 
1997, at A1; Amanda S. La Forge, Note, The Toothless Tiger—Structural, Political, and Legal 
Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
351 (1996). 
 277. See Hill, supra note 72, at 909 n.123. 
 278. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 647 (1999). Professor Sunstein’s conclusion is based on the fact that FECA 
not only authorizes private parties to file complaints with the FEC, see 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (1999), 
but also allows “any party aggrieved” by the FEC’s dismissal of such a complaint to petition the courts 
for review. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (1999). 
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specified information when they issue securities.279 Subsequent to this initial 
disclosure, the Securities Exchange Act requires publicly traded corporations 
to make regular periodic disclosures.280 Regulation S-K integrates the 
instructions for compliance with these disclosure rules for large 
corporations.281 Neither Regulation S-K nor any other provision of federal 
securities law specifically requires corporations to disclose information 
regarding corporate political contributions or expenditures.  
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowers the SEC 
to promulgate rules regarding disclosure and other topics “in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.”282 This language, as well as the 
legislative history of § 14, suggest that Congress intended the section to give 
the SEC broad authority to require disclosures of socially significant 
information.283 The SEC, however, has interpreted this authority narrowly, 
such that the criteria for determining whether corporations must disclose 
information focus on economic materiality rather than social or political 
significance.284 The SEC has taken the position that shareholders are 
interested only in economic matters and that expanded disclosure would be 
distracting and inefficient.285 
Some mistakenly believe that the materiality standards surrounding 
corporate disclosure protect shareholders by requiring corporations to 
disclose all “material” information.286 There is, however, no general 
obligation to disclose all information that might be of interest to shareholders 
or potential investors. To the contrary, a disclosure obligation must have a 
specific, independent legal foundation—corporations must disclose 
information that the SEC requests and only that information.287 In the present 
context, such obligations usually arise from the express disclosure 
requirements of Regulation S-K. Because Regulation S-K does not currently 
call for disclosure of information about election-related spending, 
corporations do not routinely provide this information.288 Even regulations 
 279. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 7-8 (3d ed. 1996). 
 280. See id. at 8. 
 281. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.702 (1999). 
 282. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000). 
 283. See Cynthia Williams, Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) 
(arguing that it is within the SEC’s power to substantially expand disclosure requirements with respect 
to socially and politically significant information, even if it is not significantly related to corporate 
financial performance). 
 284. See Kahn, supra note 72, at 1134. 
 285. See id. at 1134 n.99 (citing numerous SEC sources). 
 286. See Williams, supra note 283, at 1266 (citing NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), as an example of this error). 
 287. See id. 
 
 288. Cf. id.  
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that call for specific information are sometimes limited by explicit, 
quantitative materiality standards, generally in the range of five to ten percent 
of the corporation’s assets or earnings.289 While five to ten percent of a 
corporation’s assets or earnings may sound like a small figure, it translates 
into enormous dollar amounts. For example, for the year 2000, the fifty 
largest American corporations, based on assets, ranged in size from Citigroup 
with over $902 billion to Bank of New York Co. with over $77 billion.290  
The specific information required by securities regulations is “further 
‘filtered’ through the screen of materiality.”291 According to the Supreme 
Court, the general test of materiality “is an objective one, involving the 
significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”292 
According to the SEC, however, this hypothetical reasonable investor is 
interested only in investment return. An SEC Advisory Committee on 
Corporate Disclosure reviewed SEC and judicial standards of materiality and 
recommended that the FEC consider “social and environmental information” 
material “only when it reflects significantly on the economic and financial 
performance” of a corporation.293  
2. State Law 
As with federal disclosure requirements, state disclosure requirements 
include those under election law and those under corporate law. Most states 
require candidates to disclose their major contributors,294 and some require 
major contributors themselves to disclose their contributions.295 The specific 
requirements vary widely from state to state.296 As in the federal system, the 
 289. See, e.g., SEC Regulation S-K, Instruction 2 to Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1999) 
(requiring disclosure of pending legal proceedings if claims amount to ten percent or more of the 
corporation’s current assets); SEA Rule 14a-8(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (2000) (discussed 
infra at Part VI.C.).  
 The SEC also recognizes qualitative materiality standards. These standards typically require 
disclosure of facts that raise “questions about the integrity of management.” 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 678 (3d ed. 1989).  
 290. Fortune 500: America’s Largest Corporations, at http://www.fortune.com (last visited May 
7, 2001) (searching full list of companies and custom ranking by assets). 
 291. Williams, supra note 283, at 1208. 
 292. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). See also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988). 
 293. 2 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 675 n.157 (3d ed. rev. ed. 1999) 
(quoting HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CORP. DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 321, 395 (Comm. Print 1977)). 
 294. See FEIGENBAUM & PALMER, supra note 23, chart 1, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/of100chart1.htm. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See id.; see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.20 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE 
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value of this disclosure to shareholders depends on how well the government 
maintains and disseminates the information.297 
The power of corporations to make political contributions, political 
expenditures, and charitable and educational donations, like other corporate 
powers, is traditionally a matter of state corporate law.298 Early in this 
century, some courts held that corporate officers who authorized the 
expenditure of corporate funds for charitable or political purposes committed 
misappropriation of corporate funds. Courts in those cases held that such 
activity exceeded the scope of the corporate powers enumerated in the 
corporation’s charter or those permitted the state corporations code.299 Some 
states allowed corporate charitable contributions but required specific 
disclosure of expenditures unrelated to profits.300 The evolving notion of 
corporate social responsibility in the latter part of this century, however, led 
to a more favorable attitude toward corporate involvement in charity and, by 
extension, politics.301 Current state corporate laws, which tend to encourage 
corporate philanthropy, generally do not require management to disclose 
corporate charitable or political contributions to shareholders.302  
In addition, any state securities statutes attempting to impose disclosure 
requirements beyond those of federal law on large, nationally traded 
corporations would probably be invalid. Nationally traded securities and 
certain other kinds of securities are exempt from state law registration 
requirements pursuant to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act 
ANN. § 2-10-105 (1996). 
 297. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974); Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62 (Del. 
1969); Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). Of course, state 
corporate law intersects with federal election law, and both are subject to the First Amendment. 
 299. A Montana court, for example, held that corporate officers misappropriated corporate funds 
when they expended funds for political purposes because the state corporations code did not 
specifically mention political activity as a permissible corporate purpose. McConnell v. Combination 
Mining & Milling Co., 76 P. 194 (Mont.), modified by 79 P. 248 (Mont. 1904). In another case, an 
officer of a New York corporation contributed to a national presidential election campaign fund and 
received reimbursement from corporate funds, as instructed by the corporation’s president. People ex 
rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 384 (N.Y. 1907). He was arrested on a charge of grand larceny. See 
id. On his motion for habeas corpus, the court stated that the corporation did not have the power to 
agree to contribute to political campaigns. See id. at 387.  
 In contrast to more recent cases, McConnell and Perkins did not inquire whether the political 
expenditures would have benefited the corporation. See Marsili, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 323-24. Cf. 
Romnes, 495 F.2d at 852. In fact, such benefit could have been found in McConnell because the 
corporation was a mining concern and the expenditures included funds to support the silver cause. See 
McConnell, 79 P. at 248-49. 
 300. See Kahn, supra note 71, at 1112. 
 301. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 236. 
 302. See Kahn, supra note 71, at 1132. 
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of 1996.303 Common law also does not appear to impose a generalized 
disclosure duty on managers.  304  
Where management does not have to actively disclose information, the 
shareholder has only a limited right to seek it out. State law typically gives 
shareholders the right to inspect corporate books and records.305 A 
shareholder, however, must establish that her request has a “proper 
purpose.”306 Courts have held that “proper purpose” must relate to the firm’s 
financial condition and may not serve only the social and political concerns 
of the shareholder.307 In Minnesota ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 
shareholder Pillsbury bought a single share of Honeywell, Inc. in order to 
gain a voice in opposing Honeywell’s production of weapons for American 
use in the Vietnam War.308 Honeywell denied his request for “all corporate 
records dealing with weapons and munitions manufacture.”309 The Supreme 
Court of Minnesota held that Pillsbury was not entitled to access 
Honeywell’s books and records because “petitioner was not interested in 
even the long-term well-being of Honeywell or the enhancement of the value 
of his shares. His sole purpose was to persuade the company to adopt his 
social and political concerns, irrespective of any economic benefit to himself 
or Honeywell.”310 
 303. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See 
Richard Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes 
of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1999). 
 304. State cases occasionally allude to a common law duty of disclosure, sometimes called the 
“duty of candor.” See, e.g., Brandt v. Travelers Corp., 665 A.2d 616, 617 (Conn. Super. 1995); 
Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (W. Va. 1994). The Delaware Supreme Court, however, 
has referred to the phrase as “unfortunate terminology” and emphasized that it does not refer to any 
disclosure duties greater than those imposed by federal securities law. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 
84 (Del. 1992). See Douglas M. Branson, Securities Litigation in State Courts—Something Old, 
Something New, Something Borrowed . . . , 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 509, 525 (1998); Donald E. Pease, 
Delaware’s Disclosure Rule: The “Complete Candor” Standard, Its Application, and Why Sue in 
Delaware, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 445, 447, 452 (1989). 
 305. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(a) (rev. 
ed. 1999). 
 306. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (1999). In contrast, where a shareholder seeks access to 
shareholder lists, the corporation bears the burden of disproving proper purpose. Id. 
 307. See Kahn, supra note 71, at 1132-33 (citing Nat’l Consumers Union v. Nat’l Tea Co., 302 
N.E.2d 118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 
1971)). 
 308. 191 N.W.2d 406, 408-09, 411 (Minn. 1971). Apparently, the shareholder “had previously 
ordered his agent to buy 100 shares . . . . and also had a contingent beneficial interest in 242 shares.” 
Id. at 411. 
 309. Id. at 408. 
 310. Id. at 412. The court applied Delaware law because Honeywell was incorporated in 
Delaware. Id. at 409-10. Of course, this holding is not a definitive interpretation of Delaware law, but 
the Minnesota court indicated that the same result would be obtained if the case had been decided 
under Minnesota’s corporation law. Id. at 409. Chevron distinguished Pillsbury and indicated that the 
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Corporate management is free to engage in “educational” and even 
explicitly political spending without consulting shareholders or affirmatively 
establishing that the spending benefits the corporation.311 Shareholders, on 
the other hand, may not obtain information about such uses of corporate 
property or use the corporate forum even to raise the issue unless they can 
prove a business-related purpose.312 Management’s disclosure requirements 
do not extend to social and political expenditures, since noneconomic 
information is presumed to be of no interest to shareholders.313 In the absence 
of data about shareholders’ actual desire for such noneconomic information, 
such a presumption may be both plausible and useful in conserving the 
corporation’s resources and protecting shareholders from an overload of 
information.  
However, when a shareholder, like Pillsbury, shows actual interest in 
noneconomic information, the presumption of disinterest is defeated. 
Nonetheless, shareholders seeking such information may be dismissed on the 
normative ground that the shareholder has no “proper purpose” for the 
information.314 In this way, corporate and securities law imposes a normative 
model of acceptable shareholder concerns rather than following the 
demonstrated preferences of the real shareholder. 
C. Limitations on Shareholder Communication  
Corporate law provides shareholders with some tools for communicating 
with management and other shareholders. Shareholders’ restricted access to 
Delaware Supreme Court had expressed disapproval of Pillsbury. See Credit Bureau Reports v. Credit 
Bureau of St. Paul, 290 A.2d 691, 692 (Del. 1972). However Credit Bureau Reports stated only that 
Pillsbury was an incorrect interpretation of Delaware law insofar as it conflicted with the Credit 
Bureau Reports holding. See id. This case held that a shareholder is entitled to shareholder lists when 
he seeks them in an attempt to elect an opposition slate of directors by proxy contest, regardless of any 
other motivations he may have. Id. Pillsbury denied a shareholder’s request for ledgers for this purpose 
and thereby conflicted with Credit Bureau Reports. See Pillsbury, 191 N.W.2d at 412-13. 
 Pillsbury’s denial of the shareholder’s request for access to corporate books and records, however, 
did not conflict with Credit Bureau Reports. See Credit Bureau Reports, 290 A.3d at 692; Pillsbury, 
191 N.W.2d at 412. The “proper purpose” for access to books and records and for access to 
shareholder lists are usually treated as the same inquiry because both are articulated in section 220 of 
the Delaware Code. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1999). Similarly, they appear in the same section of 
the MBCA. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02 (rev. ed. 1999). The holding of Credit Bureau Reports is 
inapposite in the books and records context because books and records are not directly relevant to the 
solicitation of proxies in a director election. Furthermore, under section 220(b), the corporation must 
prove impropriety of purpose to defeat a request for shareholder lists, while the shareholder must 
prove propriety to obtain books and records. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1999). 
 311. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Kahn, supra note 71, at 1133. 
 313. See supra notes 284-93, 307-10 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text. 
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information about the corporation and restrictions on the kinds of issues that 
can be discussed through these tools limit the value and utility of these tools. 
In certain circumstances, shareholders can obtain access to the corporation’s 
list of shareholder names and addresses, can receive the corporation’s 
assistance in soliciting proxy votes, and can obtain access to the 
corporation’s proxy materials. Because the shareholders of a large 
corporation are numerous, dispersed, and not otherwise identifiable, the 
corporation’s lists of shareholders are a crucial method of contacting and 
communicating with shareholders. Furthermore, the vast majority of 
shareholders of large, publicly traded corporations do not attend shareholder 
meetings to exercise their voting rights but, instead, cast their votes by proxy. 
Thus, contacting shareholders by mail to inform them about corporate issues 
or to seek their support in casting their proxy votes is key to winning voting 
contests. Shareholders, however, are severely constrained in their ability to 
use the corporate forum for debate about political spending or even about the 
merits of the candidates for directorships who will make the decisions about 
such spending.  Ironically, while Bellotti defended corporate election-related 
spending on the ground that it contributed to the democratic value of 
informed political discourse in the broader society,315 such deliberation is 
absent within the corporation itself. 
As with corporate books and records, management is generally required 
to give a shareholder access to shareholder lists only if the shareholder states 
a “proper purpose.”316 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that “the desire 
to solicit proxies for a slate of directors in opposition to management is a 
purpose reasonably related to the stockholder’s interest as a stockholder” and 
that “any further or secondary purpose in seeking the list is irrelevant.”317 
When a shareholder requests shareholder lists to solicit proxies or to 
disseminate information in connection with a shareholder proposal, however, 
case law suggests that the request has a “proper purpose” only if the proposal 
has a sufficient connection to the corporation’s distinct business interests.318 
 315. See supra Part III.B. 
 316. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.02(b), (c) (rev. 
ed. 1999). Delaware law requires the corporation to disprove the existence of a proper purpose to 
justify denying the shareholder access to the lists. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (1999). The 
MBCA does not indicate who bears the burden of proof. 
 317. Credit Bureau Reports, 290 A.2d at 692. 
 318. Although this is the prevailing version of the “proper purpose” test, other jurisdictions may 
apply it differently. For example, a shareholder of an Ohio corporation has a “basic” right to know the 
identities of his or her fellow shareholders. See Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Druggists Ins. Co., 369 
N.E.2d 1066 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). Furthermore, an Ohio corporation’s shareholder who states a 
specific purpose which “on its face, is [n]either illegal [n]or unreasonable [n]or improper” is 
presumptively entitled to access to shareholder lists. Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 206 N.E.2d 
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In Conservative Caucus Research, Analysis & Education Foundation, Inc. v. 
Chevron Corp., a shareholder sought shareholder lists in order to rally 
support for a pending shareholder proposal requesting Chevron management 
to curtail its business dealings with the Communist government of Angola.319 
The political motivations of the shareholder, a group called the 
“Conservative Caucus,” were obviously significant.320 Nonetheless, the court 
went out of its way to avoid ruling that political concerns constitute a proper 
purpose.321 Instead, the court predicated its decision on the Conservative 
Caucus’s assertions that doing business with Angola could have a negative 
economic impact on the corporation because of the possibility of civil war or 
government instability.322  
In addition to state law rules regarding shareholder lists, federal law 
mandates certain narrow types of management cooperation with shareholders 
making proposals. If a corporation is soliciting proxies from shareholders, it 
must provide solicitation assistance to shareholders who request assistance in 
circulating their own proxy solicitations. Under Rule 14a-7, the corporation 
must either give the requesting shareholder a list of the shareholders it 
intends to solicit or must itself mail the requesting shareholder’s materials to 
the other shareholders.323 The requesting shareholder bears any expenses the 
corporation incurs in this process, which can be considerable.324 Thus 
management usually elects to do the mailing at the requester’s expense rather 
566, 568 (Ohio 1965). The Supreme Court of Ohio ordered the corporation to comply with Lake’s 
request for shareholder lists, which stated simply, “[t]he purpose of this demand to examine the 
records of shareholders is to obtain the names, addresses and holdings of other shareholders with 
whom I may desire to communicate regarding the affairs of the corporation.” Id. at 568. 
 Such differences among states’ jurisprudence bring up a potentially interesting theoretical issue. 
This Article’s analysis focuses on the “traditional” corporate law exemplified by the Delaware code, 
under which the majority of Fortune 500 corporations are incorporated. See Delaware Division of 
Corporations Home Page, at http://www.state.de.us/corp (last visited Apr. 13, 2001). Most states’ laws 
follow the same general contours as Delaware’s. See CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. 
THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 163 (3d ed. 1999). In theory, 
however, a state’s laws could alter the traditional shareholder role and provide for meaningful 
shareholder involvement in decision making about political expenditures. A corporation that could 
prove that its law of incorporation provides such opportunities might overcome the presumption herein 
advanced that the political expenditure is not the speech of its shareholders. Unlikely though it may be, 
such a development could engender competition among states for laws of incorporation that favor 
shareholder input. 
 319. 525 A.2d 569, 570-71 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
 320. See id. at 571. 
 321. See id. at 571-73. Concededly, however, the court also refused to rule out the possibility 
entirely. See id. 
 322. Id. at 572. 
 323. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2000). The shareholder 
chooses between the two options only in very narrow circumstances outlined in Rule 14a-7(b). Id. 
 324. See O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 318, at 251. 
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than disclose the contents of the shareholder list to the requester.325 
Rule 14a-8 provides another avenue for shareholder communication by 
requiring a corporation to include, at a shareholder’s request, certain 
shareholder proposals and supporting statements on the corporation’s proxy 
card and proxy statement.326 This Rule saves the shareholder the time and 
expense of printing and mailing her own proxy materials. The Rule applies, 
however, only to shareholders who have owned one percent or $2,000 worth 
of stock for one year and continue to hold it at the time of the shareholder 
meeting at which the vote is taken.327 Moreover, the Rule specifies many 
circumstances that allow management to exclude a shareholder’s proposal.328 
For example, the corporation may exclude a shareholder’s proposal from a 
proxy statement if the proposal deals with an issue that lacks sufficient 
economic significance to the corporation and is not “otherwise significantly 
related” to the corporation’s business.329 The economic significance test 
allows the corporation to omit a proposal that “relates to operations . . . 
account[ing] for less than 5 percent of the company’s total assets at the end 
of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings 
and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year.”330 Shareholder proposals 
regarding political expenditures at America’s most profitable corporations 
would not reach the five percent threshold unless those expenditures were in 
the range of $75 million to $1.1 billion.331 
In Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., a shareholder argued that the term 
 325. See id.  
 326. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. The corporation’s “proxy card” is the form the shareholders receive 
listing the issues to be voted on at an upcoming meeting and seeking authority to vote the recipients’ 
shares in favor of management’s positions. “Proxy statement” refers to the accompanying materials 
describing and supporting management’s positions.  
 327. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b)(1). 
 328. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-8. A shareholder may, of course, evade Rule 14a-8’s constraints by 
independently printing and mailing proxy materials at her own expense and effort. See, e.g., Union of 
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. May Dept. Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). This approach, however, is extremely expensive and time-consuming. Furthermore, even a 
wealthy shareholder will probably need access to shareholder lists to mail the proxy materials to 
shareholders. Moreover, access to lists is subject to a “proper purpose” requirement. See supra notes 
307-10, 318-21 and accompanying text. Finally, by obtaining shareholders’ discretionary authority to 
vote their shares on unforeseen issues the corporation’s proxy solicitation may preemptively obtain 
authority to vote proxies against dissident shareholder proposals, should they be presented at the 
shareholder meeting. See Securities Exchange Act Rules 14a-4(a)(3), 14a-4(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.14a-4(a)(3), (c)(1) (2000). Even if management has reason to know that dissident shareholders 
may subsequently launch an independent antimanagement proxy solicitation, management can retain 
discretionary authority by disclosing its knowledge and intent to use its discretionary authority to vote 
against dissident proposals if they are made. See Union of Needletrades, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 584-86. 
 329. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(5) (2000).  
 330. Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (2000). 
 331. See supra Part VI.C.1 (discussing the five percent threshold of Regulation S-K). 
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“otherwise significantly related”  required the inclusion of a proposal with  
“ethical or social significance” even though it failed the economic 
significance test.332 The shareholder’s proposal requested that management 
investigate whether the manufacture of pâté de foie gras imported by the 
corporation involved cruelty to animals.333 The proposal did not meet the 
economic significance test because pâté implicated only .05 percent of the 
corporation’s total assets and had no proportion of its earnings because the 
corporation suffered small net losses on its sales.334 While the court found a 
substantial likelihood that the shareholder would prevail on the substantial 
relationship test,335 it indicated that noneconomic factors alone do not satisfy 
the significant relationship test.336 Rather, the court based its ruling on the 
combination of the proposal’s “ethical and social significance . . . and the 
fact that it implicates significant levels of sales.”337 The court noted that 
“[t]he result would, of course, be different if plaintiff’s proposal was [sic] 
ethically significant in the abstract but had no meaningful relationship to the 
business of Iroquois/Delaware as Iroquois/Delaware was not engaged in the 
business of importing paté de foie gras.”338 Under this logic, a court could 
find that a shareholder’s proposal requesting that management cease or begin 
election-related spending is not significantly related to the business of the 
corporation because the corporation is not engaged in the business of 
election-related spending.339 
 332. 618 F. Supp. 554, 559-60 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 333. See id. at 556. Pâté de foie gras is made from the liver of geese, and the shareholder alleged 
that its production involves the force-feeding of the animals to increase the size of their livers. See id. 
at 556 n.2.  
 334. Id. at 558-59. 
 335. The court did not actually hold that the proposal was substantially related to the corporation’s 
business. Rather, it found that the shareholder had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing on this 
issue, and thus granted his motion for a preliminary injunction preventing Iroquois from excluding the 
proposal. See id. at 562. 
 336. Id. at 561. 
 337. Id. at 561 (emphasis added). Cf. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (upholding a proposal with both economic and political significance under an earlier 
version of Rule 14a-8). 
 338. 618 F. Supp. at 561 n.16. 
 
 339. Another exception under Rule 14a-8 allows management to exclude proposals that relate to 
the corporation’s “ordinary business.” Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 
(2000). This unfortunate choice of terminology may appear to contradict Rule 14a-8(i)(5)’s 
requirement that a proposal be “significantly related to the company’s business.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(i)(5). The exception is intended to exclude proposals that deal with everyday business decisions. The 
SEC formerly interpreted this rule very strictly, such that the exclusion extended to proposals with 
“social significance.” See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418, at 77,284 (Oct. 13, 1992), available at 1992 WL 289095. In response to public 
outcry, however, the SEC reversed this position in 1998. See Amendment to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals Investment Company Act Release No. 23,200, 67 SEC Docket 373 (May 21, 1998), 
available at 1998 WL 254809. Thus, at least according to the SEC, a shareholder who demonstrates 
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Shareholders’ primary role in corporate governance is the election of 
directors.340 Surprisingly, however, shareholders may not use the proxy 
statement to advocate for or against the election of particular directors.341 The 
apparent justification for this odd exception is the potential drain on 
corporate resources if shareholders were to have such access.342 This Rule is 
yet another indication that corporate law is meant to further efficient wealth 
creation and not shareholders’ participation or expression.  
In Bellotti, the Court stated that even if protecting shareholders from 
management abuse of corporate property constitutes a compelling state 
interest, the statute at issue was overinclusive with respect to that goal.343 
According to the Court, the statute would prohibit expenditures on referenda 
“even if [the corporation’s] . . . shareholders unanimously authorized the 
contribution or expenditure.”344 The statute would indeed have prohibited 
such an expenditure, but the Court failed to recognize that a unanimously 
authorized act by a large publicly traded corporation is a creature of fantasy. 
Corporate law does not require management to consult shareholders at all 
before making such expenditures, much less acquire their unanimous 
approval. Political expenditures specifically authorized by shareholders 
simply do not occur in large corporations. Management is not required to 
disclose such expenditures to the shareholders, so they are unable to protest. 
Even if a shareholder discovered the expenditures and wanted to launch a 
shareholder protest, the shareholder would have difficulty obtaining access to 
lists and proxy statements to inform other shareholders and organize them to 
protest. 
D. “Voting with Your Feet”: Divestment as an Unsatisfactory Remedy 
The “Wall Street Rule” teaches that if a shareholder disagrees with 
significant social policy issues can now trump management’s invocation of the ordinary business 
exception. However, case law such as Lovenheim still suggests that social significance must be 
accompanied by some economic significance. 618 F. Supp. at 561. 
 340. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text. 
 341. Rule 14a-8(i)8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2000). Before Rule 14a-8 was rewritten in 1998, 
section 14a-8(c)(8), the predecessor of 14a-8(i)(8), permitted management to exclude shareholder 
proposals relating to an election to office. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals of May 28, 
1998, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (1998). The SEC interpreted this language to allow the exclusion of proposals 
regarding elections to government office as well as director elections. See Adoption of Amendments 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999 [1976-77 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,812 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 342. See CHARLES R. O’KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 283 (2d ed. 1996). 
 343. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978). 
 344. Id. at 794. 
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management, it is more efficient for her to sell her stock than to attempt to 
change management.345 This course of action is a poor remedy, however. A 
shareholder will know she has reason to sell only after she discovers that 
management is using corporate resources for political purposes with which 
she disagrees. First, the limitations on required disclosure impair her ability 
to obtain this information.346 Second, even if the shareholder learns of 
objectionable election-related spending, “voting with her feet” allows the 
shareholder only to escape continued unauthorized use of corporate 
resources. It does not put a stop to the activity generally or provide any 
remedy for the unauthorized use that has already occurred.347  
Moreover, selling shares because of the corporation’s election-related 
spending is unlikely to have a disciplining effect on management. A sell-off 
in sufficient volume or threat of such sell-off can discipline management 
indirectly by depressing share prices and threatening their jobs. A divestiture, 
however, will not depress share prices unless an extremely large group of 
shareholders sells at roughly the same time. Even if divestiture causes stock 
price to fall, management may be unaware of the reason, as the corporate 
governance structure does not offer a method of communicating to 
management that political spending prompted the sell-off. Furthermore, 
orchestrating a concerted shareholder threat of sell-off is extremely difficult 
because of the obstacles to communicating and coordinating with other 
shareholders.348 Even if these obstacles are overcome, the exit option will not 
necessarily cause the market to provide the governance terms that investors 
prefer. Indeed, the availability of exit may actually reduce corporations’ 
incentive to satisfy investor preferences by leading investors to sell and to 
search quixotically for ideal terms rather than staying invested in the firm and 
agitating for change from within.349  
In addition, while it is literally true that “the shareholder . . . is free to 
 345. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra Part VI.B. 
 347. See Winkler, supra note 172, at 168. Furthermore, she is unlikely to find a remedy through a 
suit for breach of fiduciary duty. See infra Part VI.E.3 (discussing the enforcement of the business 
judgment rule). 
 348. See supra Part VI.B. 
 349. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 241, at 26-29, 124-25. According to Albert O. Hirschman: 
[C]ompetition may result merely in the mutual luring over of each others’ customers on the part of 
a group of competing firms; and . . . to this extent competition and product diversification is 
wasteful and diversionary especially when, in its absence, consumers would either be able to bring 
more effective pressures upon management toward product improvement or would stop using up 
their energies in a futile search for the “ideal” product. 
Id. at 28. 
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withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason,”350 selling shares 
does not serve to punish the corporation by depleting its capital. An exiting 
shareholder does not “reclaim” his capital investment from the corporation 
but merely sells his investment to a new shareholder. Moreover, 
shareholders’ “freedom” to exit is limited by the fact that exit can entail 
significant costs. If the share price is depressed at the time the shareholder 
disagrees with management, the shareholder will pay a price to exit.351 If the 
share price has appreciated, exit by liquidation of stock constitutes a taxable 
event which may impose costs on the exit.352 Furthermore, notwithstanding 
the current boom in day-trading and other high-turnover strategies, 
economists generally agree that a long-term buy-and-hold strategy is the 
most reliably profitable method of equity investing.353 Thus exit may impose 
costs even absent a depressed stock price or a tax penalty.354 
E. Wealth Maximization: A Flawed Model of Shareholder Interests 
Even though shareholders do not participate directly in election-related 
spending decisions, it may be argued that corporate governance law ensures 
that corporate actions indirectly represent shareholders’ interests. The 
standard fiduciary and contractarian models of corporate law both hold that 
management must use its control over corporate powers to enrich 
shareholders.355 This shareholder wealth maximization is both the main 
source of management power and the principal limitation upon it.356 The 
Bellotti Court failed to understand the wealth maximization principle’s 
 350. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978).  
 351. In MCFL and Austin, the Supreme Court referred to the exit problem, though it did not 
elaborate on it. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990); Mass. Citizens 
for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986). 
 352. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
 353. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from 
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 650 
(1996); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and 
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 622-23 (1995). 
 354. The restraints on exit suggest that the corporate governance regime not only prevents 
shareholders from controlling election-related spending but also forces them to fund spending they 
may disagree with. Thus, it has been argued that state restriction of corporate spending is not only 
permissible under the First Amendment but necessary to safeguard shareholders’ negative First 
Amendment rights against compelled speech. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 257-64.  
 355. See Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 891-93.  
 356. The wealth maximization doctrine is of relatively recent vintage. Before it took shape early in 
the twentieth century, the doctrine of ultra vires limited management activity to pursuit of the 
corporate powers specifically enumerated in corporate codes or charters. See GEVURTZ, supra note 
252, at 22. In most cases, this clearly prohibited election-related spending, even if it could have been 
construed as beneficial to shareholder wealth. See supra note 299. 
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intended role as a limit on management activity. It stated that the government 
violates the First Amendment if it requires business corporations to “stick to 
business” in their election-related spending.357 In fact, “stick to business” is 
corporate law’s prime directive to managers.  
Although not explicitly mentioned in state corporate codes, the wealth 
maximization principle is generally accepted as “the most basic principle of 
corporate law.”358 Under the fiduciary model, managers’ fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, the owners of the corporate assets, is often reduced to a single 
duty: namely, to maximize the value of those assets.359 In contractarian 
terms, the duty may be described as a term of the contractual relationship 
between shareholders and management.360 In areas where management’s 
powers and duties are not expressly provided for in background law or 
governance documents, the wealth maximization principle fills the gap. 
While the wealth maximization rule is a useful approximation of 
shareholder interests in most corporate governance disputes about the duties 
of directors, it has two major shortcomings as a justification of the legitimacy 
of management control over election-related spending. First, it fails to ask 
whether corporate election-related spending implicates shareholder interests 
other than wealth. Second, the business judgment rule renders the wealth 
maximization principle’s constraints on management largely illusory. Wealth 
maximizing action is not easily defined. No law actually requires 
management to prove compliance with the wealth maximization principle. 
Instead, the business judgment rule imposes a presumption of compliance 
that shields all but the most egregious management misconduct.361 
 357. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978). 
 358. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and 
the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1278 (1991).  
 359. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.”); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994) (“[A] corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”). 
 360. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 36-37; Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (1990) (“[C]ourts should treat an allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty 
as they would treat any alleged breach of contract.”). More recent versions of contractarianism suggest 
that managers are not, or should not be, constrained by the wealth maximization rule at all. See, e.g., 
Blair & Stout, supra note 252, at 249.  
 Other corporate constituents are even worse off than shareholders vis-á-vis management. They 
have no default right to information or input and no general “catch-all” rule like the wealth 
maximization rule. See infra notes 447-55 and accompanying text. 
 361. Cf. EISENBERG, supra note 242, at 3 (“While an agent must normally follow his principal’s 
instructions, shareholders have no legal power to give binding instructions to the board on matters 
within its powers.”). 
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1. Nonpecuniary Interests of Shareholders 
The wealth maximization rule ignores the diverse nonpecuniary interests 
of shareholders.362 Most shareholders likely invest primarily for the purpose 
of wealth maximization. Institutional investors, for example, generally invest 
for that purpose alone. But at least some shareholders invest for other 
reasons. For example, shareholders may purchase stock in hopes of using 
their votes to affect politically significant corporate actions.363 Moreover, 
even investors who primarily seek profit may value certain ethical or 
ideological preferences over profit.364 In Parts V and VI, this Article 
criticized the failures of constitutional law as it is applied to corporations. 
The present discussion, however, notes a potential pitfall of applying 
corporate law in the constitutional context. Corporate law’s narrow focus on 
efficient wealth creation may be appropriate when deciding most corporate 
governance disputes, which are ultimately about creating and distributing 
corporate wealth. Such a narrow focus, however, leaves corporate law alone 
ill-equipped to deal with issues like election-related spending, which 
implicates constitutional and political values as well.  
Every organization faces the problem of setting uniform group goals 
despite various and conflicting individual or factional interests. Even if all the 
interests of shareholders could be identified, the corporation’s actions might 
not satisfactorily reflect the diversity of shareholder interests or even the 
interests of the majority of shareholders. Organizational theorists observe that 
a collective decision does not clearly reveal the “underlying individual 
preferences or motivations that generated it.”365 This failure of collective 
decision making derives, in part, from transaction costs, unequal bargaining 
power, and imperfect information, and, in part, from some inherent qualities 
 362. See Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1068-70 (“While ceteris paribus higher share value 
obviously is better for the owners of the shares than lower share value, in the real world ceteris is 
rarely paribus.”). 
 363. For example, the plaintiff shareholder in Pillsbury v. Honeywell bought a single share of 
stock in the Honeywell corporation to gain a voice to oppose Honeywell’s production of weapons for 
use in the Vietnam War. 191 N.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Minn. 1971). Cf. Use Your Stock to Save Animals’ 
Lives, PETA’S ANIMAL TIMES, Spring 1998, at 17 (urging shareholders of corporations that use 
animals for product testing to donate that stock to People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
to give PETA a voice in changing the corporations’ testing policies). 
 364. Thus, for example, some mutual funds make investments guided by social responsibility 
principles ranging from environmental sensitivity to gay rights to fundamentalist religious values. See, 
e.g., Susan Sherriek, A Conscience Doesn’t Have to Make You Poor, BUSINESS WEEK, May 1, 2000, at 
204.  
 365. DAN-COHEN, supra note 203, at 33 (citing THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR (1978)). 
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of group behavior.366 As a result, a paradox of collective behavior is that it 
can yield group decisions that reflect the preferences of none of the group’s 
members.367 Even when individuals intend to act in concert, their individual 
rational behavior can result in irrational or suboptimal group actions.368  
The shareholders of a corporation have diverse financial interests and 
diverse political preferences that can conflict with the preferences of the 
hypothetical, idealized shareholder who is an undiversified, long-term 
investor. Unlike the manager, the shareholder does not owe fiduciary duties 
to the corporation or fellow shareholders. Instead, she may use any subjective 
criteria when deciding how she wants corporate resources to be used. Thus 
the shareholders, with varying and often conflicting preferences, should 
compete freely over how to use the corporate resources. The resulting 
collective action problem is analogous to the problem of setting policy goals 
in a political democracy. Political democracy encourages debate regarding 
the purposes and goals of the nation. In the corporate context, however, the 
law does not facilitate—or even permit—discussion of the purpose of the 
corporation.  
The classic contractarian view would challenge this Article’s assertion 
that corporate law fails to account for shareholders’ nonpecuniary concerns. 
Contractarianism holds that even if shareholders have no direct input into 
specific decisions, shareholders have indirectly consented to them because 
they have bargained for the terms of corporate governance.369 Thus, 
contractarians argue that the allocation of agency costs under the existing 
corporate governance regime is by definition fair.370 Even if shareholders 
have interests other than wealth, they have bargained for a governance 
system that reflects only that interest.  
Characterizing corporate governance terms as a meaningful mutual 
bargain, however, ignores information gaps and transaction costs.371 It also 
 366. See supra Parts VI.A-C. 
 367. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 203, at 33. 
 368. For example, decision making by committees often results in individual preferences 
canceling out one another and yielding compromises that please no one. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 
203, at 220. 
 369. For example, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel argue that each term of corporate 
governance (whether privately tailored or a legally supplied default) is literally bargained for because 
the cost of each term is reflected in the overall price of the share. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 196, at 18-19. 
 370. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 64, at 136-38. 
 371. Larry Ribstein, for example, argues that shareholders can choose their investments based on 
the corporation’s political activities. See Ribstein, supra note 64, at 140. This is not really possible 
because of the lack of information available to investors and shareholders which I discuss in Part VI.B. 
Professor Ribstein also argues that exiting by selling stock is costless, see Ribstein, supra note 64, at 
139-40, which I dispute in Part VI.D. 
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ignores the facts that corporate law rules are shaped by forces other than the 
mutual consent of parties and that bargaining around default rules set by law 
is not as smooth and frictionless as contractarians sometimes assume. 
According to Lucian Arye Bebchuck and Mark J. Roe, “path dependence” 
accounts for much of the content of corporate rules. They argue that “[t]he 
[economic] rules . . . [used] at any given point in time depend on, and reflect, 
the ownership and governance structures that the economy had initially. . . . 
The initial structures affect future corporate rules which in turn affect future 
decisions on corporate structures.”372 In short, a rule becomes the controlling 
authority for decision making precisely because it has been the rule in the 
past,373 not simply because the shareholders and management to whom it 
applies find it mutually beneficial.374 
The tendency for existing rules to resist bargaining applies to default as 
well as to mandatory rules. A legal rule structured as a default indicates only 
the absence of a legal prohibition against bargaining around it. It does not 
guarantee that parties who prefer another rule can easily modify the default. 
The Coase Theorem teaches that default rules will not prevent parties from 
bargaining to efficient outcomes in the absence of transaction costs.375 In the 
real world, however, transaction costs interfere with the ability to contract 
around default rules.376 As the transaction costs of explicit contracting rise, a 
default rule begins to resemble a mandatory rule. Tacit adoption of default 
rules is the path of least resistance, which reduces the transaction costs of 
establishing a corporation’s governance structure.377 The act of substituting a 
 372. Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 154 (1999). 
 373. Explanations for this tendency include transaction costs, network externalities, and 
endowment effects, which are discussed infra this Part. See id. at 139-42. 
 374. While path dependence may cause inefficient rules to persist, Professors Bebchuck and Roe 
suggest that some rules may be both path dependent and efficient at the same time. See id. at 131-32. 
 375. See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 
(1972). 
 376. Ronald Coase has deplored the tendency of theoreticians to ignore this fact when applying 
the Coase Theorem. See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174 (1988) (“The 
world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further 
from the truth. It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade 
economists to leave.”). See also Daniel Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History 
of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1996) (arguing that critics of the Coase Theorem’s 
assumption of zero transaction costs are more faithful to Professor Coase’s purpose than are those who 
assume the absence of transaction costs in applying his theorem to the real world). 
 377. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 757, 826 (1995). Professor Klausner further argues that the bias toward default rules is enhanced 
by the fact that they can generate “network benefits” to the extent that a “contractual network” forms 
around a default rule or rules. Id. at 828 (“Default terms . . . are prime candidates as focal points 
because they are well known, and they uniquely have the imprimatur of the legislature or court that 
created them.”). 
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tailored rule for a default rule in the corporation’s initial charter is a relatively 
low cost procedure. Because chartering precedes the public sale of equity, 
however, public shareholders are not parties to the initial chartering process. 
A shareholder seeking to contract around a state law default rule must alter 
the charter of an existing corporation, a process which entails substantial 
costs. These costs include identifying a problem despite barriers to obtaining 
information,378 overcoming collective action problems to organize political 
pressure on management,379 convincing the board to pass a resolution 
recommending an amendment,380 and orchestrating a political campaign to 
approve the amendment by shareholder vote.381 Furthermore, certain 
mandatory rules restrict a shareholder’s ability to contract around defaults, 
most notably the rule that only directors may initiate changes to the 
charter.382 This obstacle to charter amendment is particularly relevant in 
states whose default rules authorize corporations to make political 
contributions.383  
Transaction costs are not alone in keeping default rules in place. 
Experimental psychology suggests that the Coase Theorem may have been 
incorrect in assuming that preferences are independent of entitlement 
allocations. Some experiments suggest that people have a preference, 
sometimes referred to as the “status quo bias” or the “endowment effect,” for 
existing entitlement allocations, such as default rules, over reallocations.384 
Thus “alienable legal entitlements will be ‘sticky’—that is, tend not to be 
traded—even when such stickiness cannot be explained by transaction 
costs.”385  
Whether caused by transaction costs or other factors, the “stickiness” of 
defaults means that the initial allocation of legal entitlements is not a matter 
of indifference. It has been argued that even if the market inefficiently 
allocates entitlement between shareholders and management, it surely 
allocates them more efficiently than government can, and thus government 
should leave the allocation to market forces.386 This argument, however, 
posits a false dichotomy between law and markets. In reality, the market 
 378. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 382. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1999); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(b) (rev. ed. 
1999). See also supra Part VI.A.  
 383. See supra Part II.A (citing examples from state codes).  
 384. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power 
of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1584 (1998).  
 385. Id. (emphasis added). 
 386. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 19; Ribstein, supra note 64, at 136-44. 
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operates against a complex background of legal rules. The fact that these 
rules resist private ordering adds force to the classic Realist argument that the 
state cannot remain neutral with respect to the allocation of entitlements.387 
Whenever background default law exists, the state has given someone a 
sticky, and thus privileged, initial entitlement.388 The corporate governance 
regime gives management an initial entitlement to control election-related 
spending. Corporate campaign finance regulation does not interfere with a 
pristine market but, simply fine-tunes the states’ allocation of entitlements 
giving an advantage to management.  
Even if, despite path dependence, contracting is capable of overcoming 
all inefficient corporate law rules in the long run, such a power would ensure 
only that corporate governance terms would reach efficient arrangements 
over time. It would not address the effect of default rules on the efficiency of 
any given shareholder-management dispute at any given time.389 Every 
particular disagreement among constituents of a corporation—whether in 
connection with corporate political contributions or anything else—takes 
place over the short and not the long term.390 Even if market pressures 
eventually cause corporate governance terms to conform to shareholder 
expectations, this change fails to consider whether any given shareholder has 
consented to any given corporate election-related spending decision. 
The preceding argument has challenged the classic contractarian 
argument that governance terms are literal contracts, whose terms are bought 
and paid for through securities markets.391 Recent refinements of 
contractarian thought more convincingly concede that governance terms are 
not literal contracts, but hypothetical bargains reflecting the terms parties 
would have reached through bargaining but for transaction costs.392 
 387. See Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” 
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (1935); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, 
and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 676-77 (1979) (“The enforcement of any 
particular set of property rights . . . is inevitably distribution determinative . . . .”).  
 388. Even when a dispute is not adjudicated, background legal rules affect parties’ private 
agreements. See, e.g., Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the 
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1988); Robert 
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (“The outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives 
each [party] certain bargaining chips.”). 
 389. Bernard Black has characterized most of corporate governance law as not only nonmandatory 
but, indeed, “trivial” because it can be avoided or modified by contracting and other tactics. See 
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 
542, 544 (1990). However, this characterization applies only in the long term. Professor Black 
concedes that rules can indeed matter in the short run. See id.  
 390. Indeed, in the long run, all particular shareholder grievances, like all shareholders, are dead. 
 391. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL, supra note 196, at 18-19.  
 392. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 864-65.  
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According to Stephen Bainbridge, “corporate law default rules . . . [are not] 
entitlements but . . . our best guess as to what parties would rationally agree 
to in the absence of any pre-existing set of imposed terms.”393 The “guess,” 
however, is just that—a guess. Moreover, this guess tends to defy empirical 
confirmation. Hence corporate law default rules, like other hypothetical 
contracts, cannot meaningfully be said to reflect what parties would have 
agreed to. Rather, they reflect what lawmakers believe the parties should 
have agreed to.394 
The corporate governance regime does not provide a system to resolve 
conflicts among shareholder preferences about the purpose of their 
ownership of the corporation. Instead, it privileges one type of preference—
wealth maximization—and refuses to recognize others.395 Indeed, corporate 
law does not allow shareholders to use the corporation to pursue purposes 
other than wealth creation, even if they demonstrate that wealth 
maximization is not their actual preference.396 The principle does not operate 
as an approximate description of shareholder preferences but, rather, as a 
normative directive by the state. In corporate governance, the wealth of 
shareholders is worthy of legal protection, and other concerns are not.397 
Any legal rule unavoidably embodies some particular conception of the 
good. The law not only reflects but also communicates and shapes normative 
values.398 Despite its pretenses to political neutrality, this is as true of 
 393. Id. at 865 n.31.  
 394. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract 
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 730-31 (1990) (“The common label ‘gap-filling terms’ is a 
misnomer because the ‘gaps’ the law has to fill generally are wider than the zones filled in by the 
parties.”); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About 
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). In his discussion of hypothetical bargains, Professor 
Bainbridge, who specifically styles himself a “conservative contractarian,” candidly discloses the 
normative assumptions that drive his model of corporate law. See Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 882-
99 (emphasis added). However, most contractarians, like most legal scholars, fail to disclose or even 
recognize the normative assumptions behind their legal analysis. See Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense 
and Contract Law: Fear of a Normative Planet?, 17 TOURO L. REV. 1037, 1048-52 (2001) (discussing 
contract law’s aversion to revealing its normative assumptions); Leff, supra. 
 395. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Managers Trustees 
Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1035, 1037 (1996) (arguing that corporate law is tailored to the 
interests of a construct he calls the “fictional shareholder” and not to the interests of actual 
individuals). 
 396. See supra Part VI.B.1.  
 397. Cf. Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1067 (arguing that fiduciary duty requires managers’ 
speech on behalf of the corporation “to defend a single position that they are directed by state law to 
defend, not a position that they, or anyone else, choose”). 
 398. As Margaret Jane Radin argues:  
Where legal institutions help shape culture, they do so in part by instantiating and reinforcing 
particular conceptions of the nature of persons and their good. That is, they do so in part by means 
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corporate law as it is of other areas of the law.399 Wealth creation is a worthy 
societal goal. Centralizing power in management can contribute to achieving 
that goal, despite the risks of management abuse. Meaningful, 
multidimensional shareholder participation in corporate governance conflicts 
with that goal.400 No politically neutral reason exists, however, why this 
conflict should always be resolved in favor of efficient wealth creation. The 
resolution does not depend only on individuals’ actual priorities (which, in 
any event, cannot be satisfactorily determined), but also on what priorities 
society should encourage individuals to hold.  
Constitutional law does not and should not share corporate law’s single-
minded devotion to the maximization of wealth. Because corporate law 
justifies shareholder nonparticipation in election-related spending decisions 
based on the wealth maximization principle, the law presumes that all 
shareholders hold that view. Such a presumption amounts to the state’s 
implicit endorsement of the idea that citizens should abandon their 
nonpecuniary political priorities in pursuit of wealth. The state’s choice of 
what values to endorse can contribute to the formation of norms that will 
guide managerial and shareholder behavior.401 Certainly, shareholders have 
the right to hold and to support that mercenary view, but the law should not 
endorse such views that do not comport with the values of a self-governing 
polity.402 The law should communicate society’s disapproval of the 
of discourse, by means of underwriting a conceptual scheme. Indeed it seems that the state is 
always involved in preferring one discourse to another . . . . because of the cultural, symbolic 
nature of the government’s activities, it is implicitly promoting some specific (‘private’) goods and 
discouraging others, whether it says so or not. 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 173 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 A growing body of law and economics scholarship explores the role of the law in shaping social 
norms. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 948 
(1997) (“The state should suppress harmful norms, such as the collusive and monopolistic practices of 
cartels, and fill gaps in norms with laws, as when pollution outruns responsibility.”); Cass Sunstein, 
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031 (1996) (characterizing “law as an 
effort to produce adequate social norms . . . . [and] might either do the work of such norms, or instead 
be designed to work directly against existing norms and to push them in new directions”). 
 399. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 199, at 882-85 (criticizing the pretense of neutrality in corporate 
law scholarship and proposing an approach to corporate law explicitly based on Burkean 
conservatism); James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 7 
(1999) (“Corporate law is about norm management.”). 
 400. Then again, so does unchecked management discretion, which may encourage rent-seeking 
instead of efficient wealth creation. 
 401. Cf. Black, supra note 389, at 570 (“[M]andatory rules may help to frame a corporate culture 
that leads managers not to abuse the discretion they will inevitably have.”). In addition to the factors 
noted in Part VI.E.1 that make default rules resistant to bargaining, the state’s endorsement can itself 
contribute to the “stickiness” of these norms. Korobkin, supra note 384, at 1584. 
 402. Compare, for example, laws against the buying and selling of votes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 597-598 (2000); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(c) (1999). 
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mercenary view by rejecting the presumption that shareholders always value 
wealth above their political preferences. 
2. Indeterminacy of the Wealth Maximization Principle 
Even assuming that shareholders are interested only in monetary gain, the 
wealth maximization rule still creates problems by failing to place 
meaningful constraints on management’s election-related spending decisions. 
In the end, shareholders have virtually no direct or indirect control over 
corporate election-related spending. Voting and divestment are ineffective as 
indirect controls.403 Litigation based on the wealth maximization principle 
might seem to offer shareholders a direct tool to control management, but it 
too is severely limited in practice. The wealth maximization rule is 
sufficiently vague that managers can engage in self-interested acts without 
violating the letter of the principle. The differences among shareholders’ risk 
preferences and investment portfolios mean that there is no single course of 
action that results in universal shareholder wealth maximization. Different 
corporate strategies will maximize wealth for different shareholders.404  
Whom then are managers to serve? Courts have tended to hold that 
management must serve an idealized shareholder, who is an undiversified 
long-term investor.405 Real shareholders’ financial interests are more 
complex, however. For example, say Widget Corp. makes political 
 403. See supra Parts VI.A, C. 
 404. See generally Hu, supra note 358. The traditional interpretation of the wealth maximization 
thesis states that shareholder welfare is best served by maximizing corporate welfare, typically 
measured in terms of earnings per share. See id. at 1279. Most judges, lawmakers, and corporate 
managers ascribe to this view. See id. at 1279-80. In contrast to the traditional view, most theorists 
today agree that wealth maximization means that the corporation’s purpose is the maximization of 
share value. See id. These two views may dictate very different versions of shareholders’ best interests. 
Furthermore, neither of the views is without its problems. With respect to the traditional view, the 
maximization of a shareholder’s wealth is not always congruent with the corporation’s welfare because 
shareholders usually have diversified economic interests. See id. at 1280-82. Thus, a shareholder’s 
wealth is rarely, if ever, entirely tied to the fortunes of a single corporation. A well-diversified 
shareholder may stand to gain from high-risk, high-return behavior on the part of management, even 
though such behavior may put the corporation’s survival at risk.  
 The share-maximizing principle is similarly indeterminate. The strategies that maximize share 
value in the long run are not necessarily the same ones that maximize it in the short run. See, e.g., 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989) (holding that 
management was justified in defending against an immediately lucrative tender offer because 
management’s continued control of the corporation would supposedly yield greater share value in the 
indeterminate longer term). Thus, because shareholders hold shares for differing lengths of time, they 
will disagree as to whether long- or short-term strategies best serve their pecuniary interests. See Hu, 
supra note 358, at 1302.  
 405. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders, 53 BUS. LAW. 429 
(1998); Greenwood, supra note 395, at 1025, 1027. 
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expenditures in favor of candidate X, who intends to make it easier for U.S. 
corporations to move their widget factories abroad in order to cut production 
costs and to raise profits.406 The assertion that the rational shareholder will 
favor Widget’s support of X rests on the unrealistic assumption that the 
shareholder has no competing economic interests. Real Widget Corp. 
shareholders may have legitimate economic reasons to oppose the 
candidate’s policies. Shareholder S may have a greater financial interest in 
Gadget Inc., which builds widget factories and will be wiped out if the 
widget industry moves offshore. Alternatively, she may be an employee of 
Widget Corp. who stands to lose her job if Widget moves its production 
abroad.  
As many commentators have noticed, the interests of the hypothetical 
undiversified, long-term shareholder coincide more with the interests of 
management than those of actual diversified shareholders.407 This idealized 
shareholder prefers the conservative, stable continuation of the enterprise 
rather than aggressive attempts to realize large profits in the short term.408 
Thus, the wealth maximization rule is not only unresponsive to shareholder 
needs, it can also operate as an excuse for management to pursue its own 
interests while professing to serve those of shareholders.409  
3. Enforcement and the Business Judgment Rule  
The wealth maximization principle also fails to constrain management 
discretion because of enforcement difficulties. In theory, the wealth 
maximization principle is enforced by shareholders’ rights to file suit on 
behalf of the corporation against the managers who violate it. The Bellotti 
 406. While a corporation may not contribute directly to the candidate’s campaign, recall that it can 
give soft money to his party, establish and administer a PAC that gives to her campaign, or pay for 
issue ads that highlight campaign issues without explicitly advocating the election of a particular 
candidate. See supra Part II. 
 407. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 405, at 434; Greenwood, supra note 395. 
 408. See Greenwood, supra note 395, at 1062, 1077, 1097. 
 409. Recent statutory developments may work to free management from even nominal adherence 
to the wealth maximization principle. In a majority of states, “other constituencies” statutes authorize 
management to consider interests other than shareholder wealth, such as employees, bondholders, or 
the neighboring community. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(b) (1999); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 
(1992). By their terms, these statutes have the potential to remove all limits on management discretion, 
as they do not require management to emphasize any particular concerns. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 1715(b); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827. Indeed, some commentators have argued that such statutes 
simply increased directors’ power by insulating them from takeovers and even awarding them powers 
that shareholders had specifically refused to authorize through charter amendments. See, e.g., Lucian 
Arye Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from 
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1187 (1999); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of 
Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 129-30 (1987). 
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Court cited derivative actions as evidence that corporate governance law 
enables shareholders to control corporate election-related spending.410 A 
shareholder derivative suit, however, is a drastic and costly course of action 
likely to be worthwhile only in cases of massive abuse of funds.411 The 
inability of shareholders to organize compounds the difficulty of bringing 
suit.412 Moreover, even if shareholders bring suit, the business judgment rule 
renders management’s business decisions largely immune to judicial review. 
Under the rule, it is irrelevant whether management’s conduct substantively 
benefits shareholders, as long as management acted “on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best 
interests of the company.”413 The rule presumes that management behaved in 
this manner and places a heavy burden on shareholders attempting to prove 
otherwise. In effect, if a managerial decision falls under the rule, neither 
courts nor shareholders may disturb that decision.  
The limited case law available suggests that managerial decisions 
regarding election-related spending fall within the business judgment rule. In 
other words, courts presume that election-related spending is intended in 
good faith to serve shareholder interests. For example, in Marsili v. Pacific 
Gas & Electric Co., the California Court of Appeals used the rule to reject a 
shareholder challenge to a utility corporation’s contribution to a group 
supporting a municipal ballot measure.414 Neither state law nor the corporate 
charter expressly authorized or prohibited the political expenditure.415 The 
measure would have required voter approval for the construction of any 
building over seventy-two feet tall in San Francisco.416 While fighting the 
measure could possibly have benefited the corporation, the court did not 
 410. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). 
 411. A derivative suit may disrupt the corporate business and eat up corporate resources. Thus, 
shareholders have disincentives to bring even a meritorious suit. Moreover, shareholders may recover 
attorneys’ fees only after the completion of a successful suit. See GEVURTZ, supra note 252, at 424. 
This problem is partially alleviated by contingent fee arrangements, but the risk that attorneys take by 
working on a contingent basis presumably increases the fees shareholders must pay. 
 412. See supra Parts VI.A-C. 
 413. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Management acts may fall outside the 
scope of the rule if, for example, they constitute a “waste” of corporate assets that is, a use of corporate 
property that yields no corporate benefit. The waste rule carries little weight in light of the 
presumptions of the business judgment rule. In any event, the waste standard is “‘an extreme test, very 
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff,’ because ‘if under the circumstances any reasonable person 
might conclude that the deal made sense, then the judicial inquiry ends.’” Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 
A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,857, at 
93,145 (Del. Ch. 1995) (Allen, C.), available at 1995 WL 441999). 
 414. 51 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1975).  
 415. Id. at 318. 
 416. Id. at 323. 
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require management to show any such benefit.417 The court even indicated 
that it would be insufficient for shareholders to prove a lack of benefit.418 
Citing the business judgment rule, the court stated that in the absence of 
allegations of bad faith, the contribution was immune to a shareholder 
challenge “unless it is held, as a matter of law, that the contribution could not 
be construed as incidental or expedient for the attainment of corporate 
purposes.”419  
The ostensible purpose of the business judgment rule is the institutional 
competency concern that, unlike professional managers, “[t]he judges are not 
business experts.”420 Business judgment deference to management’s political 
decisions, however, is inconsistent with this purpose. Managers are business 
experts, not political experts, and decisions regarding political expenditures 
are not manifestly business decisions.421 A shareholder suit challenging a 
political expenditure by management does not merely question the wisdom 
of a business-related decision by management. It also raises the question of 
whether election-related spending is a business-related decision. Remarkably, 
Marsili allows managers themselves to answer this question. The opinion 
defines “business decision” as any decision that might benefit the 
corporation.422 As if this standard were not permissive enough, the court also 
defers to management’s judgment as to whether any benefit exists.423  
Such a toothless definition of “business decision” transforms the business 
judgment rule from one that requires courts to defer to managerial business 
expertise into a rule mandating deference to managerial decisions in all 
matters. It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow Marsili’s lead. 
However, the application of business judgment rule deference to the review 
 417. Id. at 324-25. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 324 (emphasis added). 
 420. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 421. While it is true that a corporate board member may be a political insider with expertise as to 
what political expenditures will “pay off” for the corporation, describing this as a matter of “business 
judgment” depends on the crass normative assumption that political influence is no more than an 
economic input equivalent to fuel, to machinery, or to intellectual property. Moreover, it concedes a 
risk of quid pro quo corruption, which Buckley recognized as a justification for regulations on election-
related spending. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976). 
 Charitable donations may arguably be characterized as business decisions because they may, as a 
side effect, materially benefit the corporation by improving the corporation’s community relations and 
public image. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 51 (Del. 1991) (“[T]he Board has determined 
that it is in the best interest of Occidental to support and promote the . . . Art Collection.”). However, 
unlike business decisions regarding the corporation’s business dealings, it is not apparent that business 
executives have special expertise in evaluating the potential side effects of charitable donations or 
election-related spending. 
 422. See Marsili, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 324-25. 
 423. See id. 
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of charitable contributions suggests that they may. In Kahn v. Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court of Delaware extended the business judgment rule to 
shareholder suits challenging charitable corporate contributions.424 Like 
Marsili, the court relied on case law applying the rule to business decisions 
but failed to explain why the rule should be imported into the charitable 
corporate contributions context.425 Because Delaware is the leading corporate 
law jurisdiction, Kahn is likely to be an influential case in many jurisdictions. 
Perhaps it is not difficult to imagine diversified, passive shareholders 
consenting to a contract giving management broad discretion to make 
political expenditures for the good of the corporation. It is implausible, 
however, to suggest that shareholders would assent to such an arrangement if 
it ensured little or no management accountability. The current regime is just 
such an arrangement. The SEC’s constricted view of disclosure means that 
shareholders have no ready means of obtaining information about managerial 
decisions.426 Even if shareholders obtain such information, the business 
judgment rule will likely insulate management’s election-related spending 
decisions from challenges by shareholders. 
Because the business judgment rule fails to constrain managerial 
discretion, using it to justify managerial control over election-related 
spending does not merely exalt wealth. It suggests that management’s 
political preferences are more worthy of respect than those of shareholders. 
Leaving both political and business decisions to the sole discretion of 
management suggests that there is no distinction at all; all decisions are 
business decisions, and political or ideological content is irrelevant. As with 
the presumption that shareholders always prefer wealth maximization, the 
extension of business judgment discretion to political decisions expresses 
norms inconsistent with our self-governing polity. Most shareholders 
presumably have neither expertise nor interest in making the corporation’s 
routine business decisions and understandably assign them to professional 
managers. However, to presume that shareholders have neither expertise nor 
interest in matters involving political preference contradicts the basic 
 424. 594 A.2d 48, 59-61 (Del. 1991). In Kahn, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation board 
approved an $85 million donation to establish the Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center, a 
project conceived by and named after Occidental’s chairman and CEO, Armand Hammer, in order to 
display his personal art collection. Id. at 52-54.  
 425. While it is possible that charitable decisions may benefit the corporation and its shareholders, 
see supra note 421, it is not clear why courts should presume this to be true without evidence. See 
Kahn, supra note 71, at 1126-27. In fact, earlier Delaware and New Jersey case law, although 
deferential to management, applied a “reasonableness” standard to corporate philanthropy instead of 
the business judgment rule. See id. at 1124-25 (citing Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 
398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969); A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)). 
 426. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text. 
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assumptions of self-government and thereby perverts the meaning of the First 
Amendment.427 
Management enjoys a presumption that corporate spending in favor of a 
candidate is intended as a worthwhile investment for the corporation, but 
managers are not required to articulate what that benefit is. If pressed, 
management would likely argue that spending is simply intended to secure 
the election of the candidate whose positions are the best for the 
corporation’s interests. Even corporate donors themselves, however, admit 
that their spending is intended to purchase influence with,428 or at least access 
to, decision makers.429 This intention is of course precisely the kind of quid 
 427. Distinguishing between communicative expenditures that are “political” and those that are 
“merely business” and thus within management discretion would admittedly be difficult in marginal 
cases. However, the mere fact that the distinction is a difficult one is not an excuse to avoid making it. 
Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 770 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for adopting an imperfect bright line rule limiting SEC Rule 10b-5 standing to 
avoid the difficulty of administering a flexible standard). 
 428. See, e.g., Edward A. Kangas, Soft Money and Hard Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at 
A27. According to Mr. Kangas, the chairman of Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, corporate contributors do 
not pursue politicians with bribes but are rather the victims of a “shakedown” by politicians. Id. He 
argues that “[t]he threat may be veiled, but the message is clear: failing to donate could hurt your 
company.” Id. See also Viveca Novak, Dialing Back the Dollars, TIME, Sept. 6, 1999, at 42. Whether 
contributions are bribes doled out by corporate managers or “protection money” demanded by 
politicians, they constitute quid pro quo corruption. 
 Kathleen M. Sullivan points out that many big political contributors are “‘political 
hermaphrodites’” that contribute to both major parties. Sullivan, Political Money, supra note 91, at 
679 (quoting LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.)). She cites this fact as 
evidence that even contributors have no confidence in the influence their money buys. See id. at 679. 
However, political hermaphrodism shows just the opposite. If the management of Politically 
Hermaphroditic Corp. (PHC) wishes to help the Democrats (or the Republicans) win, contributing to 
both parties makes no sense. But if money buys influence, it does not matter to PHC whether the 
Democrats or Republicans win. It matters only that PHC contributed to the party that wins. Because 
PHC cannot know which party will win, it contributes to both. 
 429. It is sometimes argued that campaign contributions do not constitute corruption because they 
buy only access to politicians not influence with them. The concept of access means that a major 
contributor has the opportunity to communicate directly with decision makers in a way that nondonors 
cannot. The Democratic and Republican parties openly advertise these opportunities as perks of large 
donations in connection with “Team 2000” and the “Business Leadership Trust.” See websites cited 
supra note 1. See also Mike Allen, For Party Faithful, “Packages” and Perks, WASH. POST, June 20, 
2000, at A1 (noting that Team 2000 members were invited to a private dinner with Representatives 
Kennedy and Gephardt at the Democratic National Convention). Even if the money itself does not 
“buy” any official acts—indeed, even if access does not always succeed in convincing the targeted 
politician—access to political decision makers’ time and attention is a valuable public resource, and 
buying and selling it in exchange for campaign contributions is a form of quid pro quo corruption.  
 Other commentators have gone one step further and argued that empirical evidence shows no 
connection between contributions and legislators’ voting records. See Bradley Smith, Money Talks: 
Speech, Corruption, Equality and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 58 n.91 (1997) (citing 
sources). While disproving the influence that money may justify the First Amendment protection of 
individual election-related spending, it is an inherently flawed defense of corporate spending. If 
corporate political contributions do not yield favorable political results, they do not generate any 
benefit for the corporation and, thus, constitute an improper use of corporate resources. 
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pro quo corruption the Buckley Court recognized as a justification for 
regulating contributions to candidate-election campaigns.430  
To distinguish corporations from individuals, the Austin Court invented 
the vague and unconvincing corrosion argument rather than using the 
existing corruption rationale of Buckley.431 By not pursuing the corruption 
argument, the Court seemed to concede that it could not explain why 
corporate spending is more corruptive than individual spending.432 But this 
Article’s description of corporate governance suggests such an explanation. 
Unlike individuals, corporate managers acting in good faith do not have 
authority to engage in election-related spending for purely ideological or 
expressive purposes.433 Rather, the central principle of corporate governance 
requires management to seek material benefit in exchange for election-
related spending. Even corporate codes that specifically permit corporations 
to engage in election-related spending434 do not purport to relieve 
management of its duty to maximize wealth. Thus corporate election-related 
spending in compliance with the corporate governance regime is more likely 
than individual spending to cause corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
This is true of both corporate election-related contributions and expenditures, 
though it applies with more force to contributions.  
In short, both the wealth maximization rule and the competitive 
marketplace pressure managers to engage in corrupt spending. Under the 
business judgment rule, management need not explain to courts or 
shareholder plaintiffs the corrupt purpose behind such spending. The state 
has an interest in using campaign finance law to blunt the effect of these 
perverse incentives and protections created by the corporate governance 
regime.435  
 430. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-30 (1976). 
 431. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990); Buckley, 424 
U.S. at 19. 
 432. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60. 
 433. Daniel J.H. Greenwood has argued that, as long as managers obey the mandate of corporate 
law, corporate speech merely parrots the wealth maximization rule and does not constitute “speech” at 
all. See Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1068 (“[C]itizens functioning as corporate decision makers are 
expected to set aside their politics (in the largest sense of the word, including all their views of the 
good life) and instead to work for a simple set of goals set by state law and the (legally structured) 
financial marketplace.”). 
 434. See supra Part II.A. While corporate codes allow philanthropic activity, partisan election-
related spending cannot honestly be so characterized. Unlike philanthropic spending, partisan election-
related spending is unlikely to generate goodwill in the community. A partisan position can alienate as 
many customers as it impresses. Indeed, it may be a poor business decision to support even a popular 
candidate, as public opinion seems to disfavor corporate election-related spending in general. 
 435. Alternatively, the necessity for regulation could be alleviated by wholesale changes to the 
default corporate governance regime. 
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F. Accounting for Nonshareholder Interests 
For the sake of simplicity, this Article has thus far focused on the tension 
between shareholders and management, following the lead of the fiduciary 
model and the dominant version of contractarianism.436 Recent scholarship, 
however, has criticized shareholder-centric approaches to corporate law on 
two related grounds.437 First, such approaches privilege the interests of 
shareholders and ignore managers as corporate constituents with their own 
legitimate concerns.438 Second, it fails to consider the many relationships that 
make up a corporation.439 This Part addresses these objections. As for the 
first, managers’ concerns do not justify their virtually complete lack of 
accountability for election-related spending decisions. As for the second, 
while this Article focuses on the manager-shareholder relationship for the 
sake of convenience, its argument is entirely consistent with a broad view of 
corporate relationships. Indeed, a richer model of corporate relationships 
only strengthens this Article’s argument. 
It has been argued that even if corporate election-related spending does 
not constitute shareholder expression, it implicates the expressive interests of 
the managers who make election-related spending decisions.440 A basic 
principle of corporate law, however, maintains that managers may not make 
unauthorized use of corporate resources for their personal purposes.441 This 
prohibition on mangers need not be a fiduciary duty; it may be a bargained 
for contractual term or a default rule that mimics the outcome of bargaining 
between hypothetical rational parties. In any case, the manager-controlled 
corporation makes little sense without it. Thus, if shareholders can be said to 
have authorized management to control election-related spending, such 
 436. See Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 891-93. 
 437. Another branch of corporate governance scholarship rejects both the fiduciary and 
contractarian approaches for a model based on property law. Economists have advanced the theory that 
a firm consists of “those assets that it owns or over which it has control.” Sanford J. Grossman & 
Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 
J. POL. ECON. 691, 693 (1986). Some legal scholars suggest that corporation law accomplishes 
purposes that normally cannot be accomplished by contract but are more like those achieved via 
property law. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). Unlike the fiduciary model, however, this emerging propertarian view 
does not center around the assumption that shareholders own the corporation. See id. The import of 
this model for constitutional analysis remains unexplored, though obviously Fifth Amendment takings 
jurisprudence may be relevant. 
 438. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Philanthropy Symposium Transcript of 
Proceedings—Corporate Charity: Societal Boon or Shareholder Bust?, 28 STETSON L. REV. 52, 94 
(1998); Ribstein, supra note 64. 
 439. See, e.g., Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 894-95. 
 440. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 64, at 125. 
 441. See GEVURTZ, supra note 252, at 382-83. 
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spending cannot serve management’s interests alone. The First Amendment 
does not protect misappropriation for the purpose of expressive activity.442 
In response to this critique, some have argued that unbridled management 
control over election-related spending is not misappropriation, but a 
legitimate, bargained for perquisite of management—in effect, a form of 
executive compensation.443 This characterization, however, is not accurate. 
Election-related spending is not treated as compensation for purposes of 
managers’ personal income tax or corporate tax limits on the deductibility of 
employee compensation.444 Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to posit that 
shareholders have willingly given management such unlimited control over 
corporate property.445 Such a broad exception would render the rule against 
misappropriation practically meaningless. Because election-related spending 
need not be disclosed, management can award itself this form of 
compensation without any accountability to shareholders or other corporate 
constituents. Such compensation would amount to a license to loot the 
corporation. Whether the corporate “contract” is hypothetical or explicitly 
bargained for, such unchecked power is not a credible interpretation of the 
contract. Finally, while academics may debate the management 
compensation argument, it is unlikely that any party with the proper standing 
(i.e., an actual corporate director or officer) would ever have the chutzpah to 
assert it before shareholders, judges, or lawmakers.446 
This Article focuses on the shareholder in order to refute the common 
myth of “corporate democracy” that empowers the shareholder. This focus is 
not intended to dismiss the importance of other corporate constituents and 
relationships.447 Indeed, the idea of corporate complexity requires 
acknowledgement of multiple corporate relationships. This Article focuses 
on the shareholder-management relationship only as an example and not to 
the exclusion of other relationships. In fact, this Article’s argument is 
ultimately consistent with models that include a broader range of 
 442. Cf. Brudney, supra note 16, at 247 (“A’s right to receive information does not require the 
state to permit B to steal from C the funds that alone will enable B to make the communication.”).  
 443. See Ribstein, supra note 64, at 125. Margaret Blair has made a similar argument with respect 
to corporate charitable donations. See Blair, supra note 438. 
 444. Cf. Sugin, supra note 203, at 878-79 (citing I.R.C. §§ 162(a)(1)-(m) and arguing that 
management discretion over charitable contributions is not management compensation). 
 445. Cf. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why they Give at the Office: Shareholder 
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in a Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1195, 1220 (1999) (criticizing Margaret Blair’s defense of management control over charitable 
donations). 
 446. Similarly, managers have hardly trumpeted their support for Henry Manne’s thesis that the 
opportunity to trade securities on inside information is a form of management compensation. See 
HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 111-48 (1966). 
 
 447. See supra introduction to Part V. 
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relationships. Several models argue that not only shareholders, but many 
other parties, have legitimate interests that constrain management’s use of 
corporate property. Parties such as bondholders and employees have 
important relationships with corporate management.448 The “connected 
contracts” model suggested by Professors Mitu Gulati, William Klein, and 
Eric Zolt makes a logical extension of the nexus of the contracts approach by 
arguing that the shareholder-management relationship is not the central facet 
of the corporation, but just one of many corporate contracts.449 This 
connected contract approach implies “no natural allocation of control to 
equity investors.”450 The team production theory, as articulated by Professors 
Blair and Stout, rejects the notion of managers as agents of the shareholders 
and argues instead that management’s purpose is “to protect the enterprise-
specific investments of all the members of the corporate ‘team.’”451 The 
“progressive” or communitarian view argues for greater access to corporate 
decision making and resources by nonshareholder constituents such as 
employees and the community in which the corporation does business.452 
Some of today’s “progressives” have revived Merrick Dodd’s venerable 
argument that a corporation’s managers must be guided by social 
responsibility as well as shareholder wealth maximization.453 
These models suggest that the expectations not only of shareholders but 
also of creditors, employees, customers, and others should be interpreted to 
include at least some implied restrictions on management’s control over 
corporate political spending. This conclusion does not depends on 
entitlements stemming from ownership or fiduciary principles. Rahter, it is 
supported by the basic fact that contracts involve a degree of give and take. 
No model based on bargaining can explain why the corporation’s many 
constituents would allow one constituent group, management, to command 
unilateral discretionary control over election-related spending or any other 
use of corporate resources.454  
 448. See, e.g., Lawrence Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1165 (1990); Marleen O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993). 
 449. See Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 894-95. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Blair & Stout, supra note 252, at 253. 
 452. For works by some of the leading “progressives,” see PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 453. See Edwin Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
(1932); David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, 
in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 452, at 1. 
 454. See Butler & McChesney, supra note 445, at 1220 (“Surely, the limits of directorial 
discretion must relate to either the ‘team’ aspect or the ‘production’ aspect of team production.”). 
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A corporation’s election-related spending does not reflect shareholder 
expression; it is even less reflective of the expression of other constituents. 
By positing that “the corporation” properly includes interests outside the 
traditional boundaries of the firm, the connected contracts, team production 
and social responsibility models question whether a corporation has any 
fixed boundaries at all.455 Thus, shareholders are not the only disenfranchised 
corporate constituents. While the fiduciary model assumes that shareholders 
are entitled to control corporate decision making because they are the owners 
of the corporation, this Article makes no such assumption. Whether corporate 
law wrongly denies shareholders control over the corporation is beside the 
point. Rather, the passivity of the shareholder’s role, whether right or wrong, 
means “corporate” political spending is not a form of shareholder expression. 
Nor is it the expression of other corporate constituents (other than upper 
management). Corporate law cannot constitute the expression of 
nonshareholder corporate constituents, because they have even less input into 
corporate decisions than shareholders do. These corporate stakeholders—
such as creditors, employees, customers, the neighboring community, and the 
environment—do not have even the shareholders’ limited opportunities for 
formal participation in corporate decision making. In addition, their ability to 
use informal pressure to affect corporate political decisions is weakened 
because they do not have the information rights of shareholders either. On 
one level, this amplifies the complaint that corporate governance and 
campaign finance law regimes give managers disproportionate control over 
the corporation’s “speech”. The argument that management acts are 
legitimated by shareholders via corporate democracy is not only inaccurate 
but irrelevant. Even if shareholders have consented to give management 
control of election-related spending, other constituents with equally 
legitimate interests in the corporation have not. On a deeper level, the 
powerlessness of nonshareholders suggests an even more devastating critique 
of corporate “expression”: the problem is not that one constituent group 
(shareholders) is disenfranchised, but that it is impossible even to identify, 
much less empower, all the corporation’s relevant constituents. The 
constituents comprising the corporation are so diverse, decentralized, and 
amorphous that there can be no meaningful participatory process by which 
they can support or oppose the political positions management presents as 
representative of the corporation’s interests. 
There are of course important policy reasons for the existing 
concentration of power in top management. As the team production theory 
 455. See Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 896-97. 
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argues, the concentration of control in upper management is certainly more 
efficient than participatory corporate governance when shareholders and 
other constituents are numerous and widely dispersed.456 Under a 
participatory governance system, corporate political spending would more 
likely constitute a form of individuals’ expression. Such a system of 
corporate governance would, however, be cumbersome, slow, and costly, 
thereby reducing corporate profitability. This Article does not mean to argue 
that publicly traded business corporations should adopt more participatory 
forms of governance. The point is, rather, that corporate governance can be 
centralized and efficient, or it can be participatory and expressive, but it 
cannot be both. Law and markets have created a corporate law regime that 
favors the efficient over the expressive and, thus, have created organizations 
that deserve less First Amendment protection than individuals do. 
VII. APPLYING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS TO CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Court has struggled with the First Amendment issues regarding the 
regulation of corporate political expenditures.457 Much of the difficulty 
comes from a reluctance to explore how the special characteristics of the 
governance system for large business corporations distinguish election-
related spending by such corporations from spending by individuals. 
Monolithic conceptualizations of the corporation as a person or a harmonious 
aggregation are easier to grasp than the idea of a complex association in 
which the voices of constituents are not always heard. Thus, in Bellotti, the 
Court failed to look at the complexity of corporate governance and presumed 
that corporate election-related spending reflects shareholders’ decisions.458 In 
Austin and MCFL, the Court suggested that election-related spending by 
business corporations is somehow less deserving of protection than speech 
by individuals or political organizations,459 but it failed to provide a coherent 
justification for this distinction. Instead, its reasoning was largely conclusory 
and inconsistent with its earlier ruling in Buckley. The Austin Court’s 
reasoning suffered from two major weaknesses. First, by justifying regulation 
with the lack of public support for corporate views, the Court contradicted 
the central and longstanding Buckley rule against the equalization of relative 
 456. See Blair & Stout, supra note 252, at 322. 
 457. See supra Part III. 
 458. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). See supra Part III.B. 
 459. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990); Mass. 
Citizens for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986). 
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voices.460 Although many commentators have criticized this aspect of 
Buckley, it remains a touchstone of campaign finance jurisprudence. Austin 
contradicted the Buckley rule while purporting to leave it in place.461 This 
equivocation leaves Austin standing on shaky ground and provides no clear 
guidance to future judges or legislators. Second, the Austin Court relied on 
the grant theory in basing its ruling on the special privileges of 
corporations.462 Not only is this reasoning conclusory, it also makes the 
troublesome implication that incorporation is predicated on unconstitutional 
conditions. 
The Court must develop a First Amendment analysis of corporate 
election-related spending distinct from the analysis of individual spending. 
That analysis must be based on the realities of contemporary corporate 
governance. With respect to publicly traded corporations operating under 
default corporate governance rules, the Bellotti Court’s presumption that 
shareholders control election-related spending is unfounded, and the 
reasoning of that opinion inapplicable. For publicly traded corporations, the 
Court should apply the reverse presumption: that election-related spending 
does not constitute the expression of shareholders or of any of the 
corporation’s other constituent individuals.463 Because a corporation is not a 
human being with First Amendment expressive rights of its own, any 
expressive rights involved in corporate election-related spending must be 
those of the individuals within a corporation. As Part VI shows, however, the 
corporate governance regime does not give shareholders actual control over 
decisions regarding corporate election-related spending. Part VI’s description 
of the decision-making process illustrates modern corporate law’s 
 460. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659. 
 461. See id. at 659-60. 
 462. See id. at 659. 
 463. In Bellotti, Gillette Co. and Digital Equipment Corp. in particular were the type of massive 
publicly traded corporations as to which this presumption should most clearly apply. See supra notes 
233-34 and accompanying text. A corporation could attempt to rebut this presumption with evidence 
that its governance varies from the default system in such a way that its political decisions involve 
shareholder expression. For example, it is conceivable (although unlikely) that a business 
corporation’s charter might expressly authorize management to take certain types of political action in 
accordance with specified procedures, such as a shareholder vote. Cf. Brudney, supra note 16, at 257-
59 (arguing that the First Amendment would permit a legal requirement conditioning corporate 
political speech on unanimous shareholder consent); O’Kelley, supra note 177, at 1363 (“The key 
consideration, therefore, is the identity between the member or shareholder and the person who is 
actually expressing himself.”). 
 Corporations (particularly closely held corporations) may vary their governance structure to 
include active shareholder participation in management. See supra introduction to Part VI. If 
shareholders are indeed actively involved in decision making, such corporations might avoid the 
presumption against shareholder expression even if their charters do not expressly authorize political 
activity. 
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recognition of “corporate complexity” and demonstrates the inadequacy of 
the traditional ideas of the monolithic corporation. Shareholders (and other 
corporate constituents other than managers) have no meaningful input into 
the decision-making process regarding election-related spending. Rather, 
such spending is controlled by managers with no real accountability. The 
default rules of corporate governance concentrate control in the management 
to streamline the decision-making process. This arrangement neither furthers 
the ideals of self-governance nor plausibly reflects the kind of arrangement 
shareholders and management would reach through explicit bargaining. 
The Bellotti Court purported to base its decision solely on listeners’ 
rights,464 but the question of expressive rights cannot be ignored because the 
lack of expressive rights in publicly held corporations undermines the 
listeners’ rights theory. Even assuming arguendo that more political speech is 
always good for society,465 no reason exists why society should allocate the 
cost of this general societal good to shareholders rather than spread it more 
broadly over society. Listeners’ interests may require the state to refrain from 
blocking individuals’ access to messages, but they do not require other 
individuals to foot the bill for those messages.466 To the extent that corporate 
governance law places the cost of corporate political speech on shareholders, 
it imposes a random tax on those shareholders unfortunate enough to invest 
in corporations whose managers choose to use corporate resources for this 
societal good.467 Furthermore, because the business judgment rule allows 
managers to unilaterally determine when corporate resources will be used for 
the benefit of society, the state has given managers complete control over the 
distribution of the tax burden. Ceding decision-making authority from the 
state to unaccountable private parties makes the taxation all the more unfair.  
 464. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. 
 465. Some commentators argue that unregulated corporate election-related spending disserves 
listeners’ interests, because the unrestricted flow of political advocacy merely creates a confusing 
information overload without enlightening voters. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1019 
(discussing cascade theory). 
 466. Cf. Brudney, supra note 16, at 247 (“[I]t does not follow that the public is entitled to the 
exchange of the information . . . if speakers do not wish, or are economically or organizationally 
unable, to make such communications.”). 
 467. Thus it resembles an uncompensated taking of shareholder property. Cf. LAWRENCE TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that the Fifth Amendment requires 
compensation for takings so that public goods are not paid for by uneven random taxation). 
 Although referring to shareholder “property,” this Article does not enter the debate over whether 
shareholders “own” the corporation. See Booth, supra note 405, at 429; Jonathan R. Macey, An 
Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991). Shareholders have a residual claim to the 
corporation’s resources; whether this is a property or contractual right makes little difference in the 
present context. In either case, corporate resources used to pay for public goods ultimately come out of 
the residuum to which shareholders are theoretically entitled. 
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An understanding of corporate governance law also shows that regulating 
corporate election-related spending can prevent quid pro quo corruption or 
the appearance of corruption, which Buckley identified as a compelling state 
interest sufficient to justify campaign finance regulation.468 If corporate 
spending in favor of a candidate is in compliance with corporate law, those 
contributions cannot be made for purely ideological reasons;469 they must be 
made for the purpose of material benefit to the corporation. Hence, corporate 
contributions are more likely than individual contributions to involve 
corruption. As a result, it would be consistent with Buckley to impose tighter 
restrictions on corporate contributions than on individual contributions. This 
reasoning applies to soft money contributions to political parties as well as 
direct contributions to candidates. Soft money can buy influence with a party 
just as contributions can buy influence with candidates, and soft money is 
ultimately used to support candidates.  
Tighter restrictions on corporate expenditures are justified as well. 
Buckley rejected all restrictions on individual expenditures.470 The Court 
reasoned that individuals’ expenditures pose less danger of corruption than 
individuals’ contributions do because the individual, not the candidate, 
determines how the expenditure is used.471 Corporate expenditures may pose 
less danger of corruption than corporate contributions do, but because 
corporate spending must yield material benefit, corporate expenditures are 
more likely to seek a quid pro quo than are individual expenditures. 
Restrictions on corporate spending in support of candidates or parties are 
justified on the ground that they guard against corruption and the appearance 
of corruption.472 Regulating corporate contributions and expenditures with 
respect to initiative or referendum campaigns cannot be justified on this 
basis, however, because such campaigns have no candidates to corrupt. 
Moreover, there are other government interests that are implicated by all 
types of corporate election-related spending. While fighting corruption is the 
only compelling government interest the Court has ever explicitly identified 
in the context of campaign finance regulation, the protection of shareholders 
from management abuse may also qualify.473 The Court has suggested this 
 468. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 26-27 (1976). 
 469. See supra Part VI.E.3. 
 470. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59. 
 471. See id. 
 472. Buckley recognized this government interest as sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions 
on election-related spending. See id. at 26-28. 
 473. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
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argument even though it has never explicitly accepted or rejected it.474 For 
example, in 1948, the Court stated with approval that the Tillman Act was 
motivated in part by “the feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to 
use corporate funds for contribution to political parties without the consent of 
the stockholders.”475 In 1982, a unanimous Court held that shareholder 
protection is a permissible justification for the FECA rule that a corporation 
may solicit PAC contributions only from its “restricted class.”476 In addition, 
the state also has an interest in avoiding the transmission of a cynical, 
mercenary view of politics,477 which may also qualify as a sufficiently 
compelling interest.478  
Thus, this Article’s analysis is consistent with conventional First 
Amendment justifications of regulation in the “compelling interest” vein. But 
moreover, this Article supports a more sophisticated and, admittedly, 
controversial argument: unlike regulations on individual election-related 
spending, regulations on corporate spending should be reviewed under less 
than strict First Amendment scrutiny and can thus be justified by less than 
compelling government interests. Randall Bezanson has argued that a relaxed 
standard of review should apply to regulations on “institutional speech” that 
is not “traceable” to the speech of an individual.479 First Amendment 
jurisprudence has evolved around the traditional paradigm of speech as the 
act of an individual. Individual speech implicates both expressive and 
listeners’ interests. Much ink has been spilled over which interest should be 
 474. Recall that the Bellotti Court accepted it for the sake of argument only. See First Nat’l Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 475. United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). Cf. United States v. 
Chestnut, 394 F. Supp. 581, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding statute 
descended from the Tillman Act after weighing “the First Amendment rights of corporations and labor 
unions . . . against the substantial governmental interests . . . in preventing corporate and union 
officials from using corporate assets or general union dues to promote political parties and candidates 
without the consent of stockholders”); Schwartz v. Romnes, 357 F. Supp. 30, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 
rev’d on other grounds, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding New York statute prohibiting 
corporate political expenditures based in part on the “overriding governmental interests” in 
“prevent[ing] corporate officials from devoting the assets of a corporation to political causes with 
which its shareholders might not agree”). 
 476. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982). 
 477. See supra Part VI.E.1. 
 478. As with the state’s interest in fighting the appearance of corruption, the point is to prevent 
public perceptions “that may undermine the public’s faith in the [political] system.” Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 19. 
 479. According to Randall Bezanson: 
If there is no individual speaker at the source of the speech, . . . the First Amendment’s protection 
for freedom of speech—for the individual liberty of speaking—does not apply; instead, the First 
Amendment interest is limited to the artifact of the speech itself and is made subject to the larger 
governmental regulatory objectives related to accuracy, equality, fairness, access, and utility. 
Bezanson, supra note 6, at 781 (describing this theory in detail).  
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favored when the two conflict.480 Relatively less attention has been paid to 
whether First Amendment analysis should be different when only the latter 
interest is involved and the former is absent. Corporate election-related 
spending highlights this issue. When speech does not implicate individual 
expressive rights,481 but only listeners’ interests, its regulation does not 
infringe on individual liberty—indeed, regulation can advance liberty, as the 
random taxation argument demonstrates. Because there is no danger of 
stifling individual liberty by regulating corporate election-related spending, 
legitimate government interests such as those described above are sufficient 
to justify regulations even if those interests are less than compelling. This 
approach is more powerful than justifications based on so-called “compelling 
interests.” Unlike the corruption rationale, it is not limited to spending on 
candidate elections. And unlike the shareholder protection rationale, it does 
not require the Court to recognize a new government interest as 
“compelling”. Moreover, this approach is consistent with both shareholder-
centered models and multiconstituent corporations theory as described in Part 
VI.F of this Article. By avoiding the shareholder protection rationale, the 
current approach transcends the debate over shareholder primacy.  
 
 
Although neither expressive interests nor listeners’ interests justify 
striking down regulations on corporations’ election-related spending, 
regulations may nonetheless be illegitimate for other reasons. For example, 
while listeners’ interests do not justify the Bellotti decision, the statute in that 
case was overbroad in that it prohibited all business corporations from 
spending in connection with referenda.482 Similarly, the Michigan statute at 
issue in Austin applied to all corporations.483 As interpreted by the Court, the 
 480. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing 
Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591-95 
(1982). 
 481. Professor Bezanson cites the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce’s expenditures in Austin 
as one example of such speech. He also cites the professional advice of doctors in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173 (1991). See Bezanson, supra note 6, at 767-72. The Court denied First Amendment 
protection of doctors’ advice to patients regarding abortion because the professional advice of a doctor 
is “effectively scripted by the standards of the profession. A physician, in effect, is speaking for the 
profession, or at least in the role of physician, not for himself or herself as an individual.”  
 The Court apparently agreed with Professor Bezanson and rested its decision on the theory that 
regulating doctors’ advice does not implicate their expressive rights. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 
(defending regulations, which prohibited doctors from advising pregnant patients to seek abortions and 
which required them to encourage patients to carry their pregnancies to full term, because the 
regulations did not require any doctor “to represent as his [sic] own any opinion that he does not in fact 
hold”). 
 482. 435 U.S. 765, 768, 794 (1978) (discussing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 
1977)). 
 483. 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1989) (discussing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)). 
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statute at issue would apply to all business corporations, as well as nonprofit 
organizations that resemble business corporations.484 As the Michigan statute 
was nearly identical to § 441b of FECA, § 441b presumably has the same 
scope.485 In light of MCFL, neither the Michigan statute nor FECA would 
apply to “political” nonprofit organizations.486 Accordingly, all three statutes 
focus on an organization’s incorporated and business-oriented status and not 
on the issues of corporate complexity. Election-related spending may in fact 
constitute shareholder expression in some corporations, such as a corporation 
owned by a single person or a closely held corporation actively managed by 
its shareholders. Those shareholders do not require state protection from 
management abuses. Moreover, the statutes would violate those individuals’ 
First Amendment expressive rights. Thus, all three statutes might be found 
unconstitutional as applied to a small, owner-controlled corporation. 
Keeping this in mind, FECA should be reformed to give more leeway to 
closely held corporations, while imposing tighter restrictions on public 
corporations. For example, closely held corporations could be given the 
opportunity to prove that their election-related spending is the result of active 
input from both shareholders and management. Public corporations, 
however, should face a strong presumption to the contrary. Indeed, with 
respect to public corporations, Congress should close FECA’s loopholes and 
give meaning to its nominal restrictions on corporate spending. For example, 
Congress could prohibit public corporations from contributing soft money to 
political parties and from spending money on PAC solicitation and 
administration. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In addition to highlighting the distinction between large and small 
corporations, this Article also points out the importance of limiting analysis 
of corporations to the corporations of a particular time and place. In 1932, 
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means pointed the way toward modern 
agency cost theory with their seminal exploration of the separation of 
ownership and control in large business corporations.487 Gregory A. Mark, 
however, has charged that this work, however insightful it may have been at 
the time, “exemplified the inability of realist scholarship to provide a 
 484. See id. at 661-62. 
 485. See id. at 655 n.1. 
 486. See id. at 662; Mass. Citizens for Life v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986). 
 487. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
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framework for legal thought to reach beyond contemporary conditions.”488 
Whether or not Berle and Means, or the Realists generally, deserve that 
criticism,489 Mark makes an important jurisprudential point. While the 
application of corporations theory to public policy must take into account 
real corporations as they exist today, we must not assume that today’s 
corporate governance terms have always existed or need always exist in the 
future.490 Although the concept of the corporation has been a part of Western 
law for centuries, the legal regime and economic factors determining the 
precise nature of the corporation vary in different times and jurisdictions. 
This Article’s arguments are specifically grounded in the characteristics of 
public business corporations following the default rules of corporate 
governance in the early twenty-first century United States and does not 
necessarily extend beyond those corporations. By pointing out factors that 
inhibit shareholder participation, this Article also suggests how governance 
rules might be changed if legislators or corporate constituents wish to make 
the regulation of corporate election-related spending unnecessary.  
 
 
While business corporations vary in their specifics, corporate governance 
and securities regulation law establish a default regime for large, publicly 
traded corporations which minimizes shareholder input. Although this 
regime may be an effective means of creating and maximizing wealth, it 
shortchanges other political values. Corporate law prizes wealth 
maximization, but that value need not control the application of 
constitutional law to corporations. The law should not treat political 
expenditures as just another economic input to which shareholders have no 
relevant nonpecuniary expertise or preference.  
Even if we accept listeners’ interest in hearing political messages as a 
justification for First Amendment protection of corporate election-related 
 488. See Mark, supra note 154, at 1481. Cf. Gulati, Klein & Zolt, supra note 192, at 896 (arguing 
that a contemporary high-tech startup firm, compared to the stereotypical large “old economy” firm, 
may be comprised of more fluid, less hierarchical contracts). It should be added that “the dominant 
corporate form varies widely from country to country.” Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and 
Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 
AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 604, 605 (1999) (noting Japanese law recognizes corporate “personality” more 
than the United States and the United Kingdom do, with most of Europe “somewhere in between”). 
 489. Indeed, it seems that the very point of Realism is that the “inability . . . to reach beyond 
contemporary conditions” is an inherent characteristic of all legal analysis (and not a special flaw of 
Realism). Mark, supra note 154, at 1481. 
 490. Berle and Means’ theory supplanted the traditional theories because it accounted for the 
relatively new phenomenon of immense corporations with atomized, passive investors. See Lynne L. 
Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
19, 20-21 (1988); Carl Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in 
an Era of Downsizing and Corporate Reengineering, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1700 (1996) (book 
review). 
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spending, that interest does not necessarily trump all other interests. Some 
balancing must occur. Speech protection is determined by balancing 
individual rights against societal interests. Because of the high regard for the 
individual right to speak, First Amendment jurisprudence requires the 
articulation of a compelling interest to burden speech. Corporate speech is 
not an exercise of individual expressive rights, however. Thus speech 
protection for corporations should be based on a weighing of societal 
interests rather than on the absolutist rhetoric of rights. The airing of political 
opinions may have social value favoring protection, but this social value 
must be weighed against social harms, such as the unfairness of random 
taxation, the potential for corruption, and the appearance of corruption. 
In Bellotti, the Court purported to consider multiple interests by 
acknowledging to the public interest in hearing corporate ideas.491 Instead of 
actually engaging in balancing, however, the Court suggested that all 
political expenditure is socially beneficial and, thus, deserves protection.492 
The Court gave only cursory attention to policy reasons supporting the 
regulation of corporate expenditures, such as the interests of shareholders. 
When the Austin Court upheld restrictions on corporations’ election-related 
spending, it failed to provide a convincing justification for treating 
corporations differently from individuals. As this Article demonstrates, 
constitutional jurisprudence as applied to corporations must abandon 
conclusory, old metaphors and account for the realities of contemporary 
corporate governance. 
 491. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-82. 
 492. See id. 
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